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Contract  plans help clarify goals,  increase  managerial  auton-
omy, and open a dialogue between management and govern-
ment - but their benefits have been oversold.
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Roughly 100 public enterprises in developing  The problem is, they have been oversold.
countries (50 of them with Bank support) are  The- are no.  he mechanism of choice for
using contract plans - ncgotiated performance  healing a sick company. They work best with
agreements between the govemment/owner and  firms that operate commercially and already
the enterprises' managers or directors.  have decent management and sound financial
and reporting procedures.
Contract plans have not improved the
financial performance of public enterprises  In supporting contract plans, the Bank
dramatically.  The process is probably more im-  should keep ambitions modest and emphasize
portant than me  prcduct.  the clarification of goals, increased managerial
autonomy, and open negotiating between
They do produce clearer goals, open a  management and govenmment. Contract plans
dialogue between management and the state, and  should not be a condition of Bank adjustment
offer such benefits as better accounting, audit-  operations - at least not until the process has
ing, and management information systems,  been tested and shown positive results in the
including physical and financial performance in-  country.
dicators and performance targets.
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Executive  Summary
I.  Introduction
1.  Contract-plans  are  negotiated  performance  agreements  between
governments,  acting  as owners  of  a public  enterprise,  and  the  manar,ers  or
directors  of the  enterprise  itself. In  a contract-plan  (henceforth  CP)  the
intentions,  obligations  and  responsibilities  of the  two  parties  are  freely
negotiated  and  then  clearly  set  out. This  appears  simple;  but  the  fact  is
that  ambiguity  of goals  and  conflicting  objectives  have  long  been
identified  as major  obstacles  to the  effective  and  efficient  performance  of
public  enterprises.  CPs  define  the  enterprise's  objectives,  and  state  what
resources  and  latitude  vill  be provided,  by government,  to  enterprise
management  so that  it  may  accomplish  the  specified  goals. Many  CPs  set  out
the  physical  and  financial  indicators  which  will  measure  enterprise
performance.  Many  establish  the  principle  that  government  will  compensate
the  enterprise  for  costs  incurred  in  fulfilling  non-commercial  objectives,
and  specify  the  way in  which  the  compensation  vill  be  made.  In theory,  the
agreement  concluded  binds  both  signing  parties,  in  the  manner  of  a formal
contract.
2.  The  mechanism  vas  invented  by the  French  and  applied,  in  the  1970s
and  the  1980s,  to  eight  large  public  enterprises,  all  monopolies  or
oligopolies  with  heavy  social  service  obligations.  In 1983,  the  French
government  concl"tded  thirteen  CPs  of a  slightly  different  nature  with
nationalized  industrial  public  enterprises.  The  concept  has  been  exported;
first  to  francophone  countries  in Sub-Saharan  and  North  Africa  --  with
Senegal  and  to  a lesser  extent  Morocco  having  the  most  extensive  and
lengthy experience  with the process --  to several anglophone  African
countries;  then  to  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Mexico  in  Latin  America,  and  most
recently,  in  some  experimental  efforts  in  Bangladesh  and  India. This  paper
examines  in  detail  the  French  and  Senegalese  experiences,  reviewing  the
objectives  of the  CP  process,  where  these  performance  agreements  have  been
applied,  with what results --  economic, financial  and institutional --  and
what  lessons  have  been  learned. Several other  cases  of  CP use  receive  a
brief  review. They  are  either  too  new  or too  few  to  be analyzed  in  depth;
though  the  promising  Moroccan  situation  is  given  some  attention.  There  are
roughly  one  hundred  public  enterprises  in  developing  ccuntries  that  have
CPs,  and  another  one  hundred  are  in  preparation.  The  World  Bank  is
presently  supporting  the  process  in  over  fifty  enterprises  in  ten  different
countries.-ii-
II.  The  French  Experience
3.  The  first  two  CPs --  then  called  "program-contracts"  --  vere
signed  in 1969-70;  with  the  national  electricity  company  and  the  national
railway. They  defined  objectives,  and  quantified  financial  performance
targets,  for  the  firms  for  the  five  year  period  of the  agreement.
Agreement  on  objectives  was  reached  through  a process  of  negotiation
between  government  and  management.  The  basic  idea  was that  if  goals  were
both  agceed  upon  and  clearly  set,  then  government  could  lighten  its  time-
consuming  a priori  controls,  provide  management  with  efficiency-enhancing
autonomy,  and  evaluate  the  firm  on the  basis  of achievement  or  non-
achievement  of the  set  goals. They  stipulated  significant  rate  hikes  and
called  for  increases  in  managerial  autonomy  on  personnel  and  pricing
decisions.
4.  In the  first  half  of the  contracted  period,  results  were  positive.
Budgetary  aid  to the  two  declined  by 20  percent  in  the  period  1970-72.
This  vas  encouraging;  the  budgetary  burden  issue  was  the  one  which  most
interested  the  French  government  of the  day (and  it  remains  the  issue  for
LDC  governments  using  the  device). The  rate  increases  in electricity  were
sufficient  to allow  the  utility  to  cover  its  variable  costs,  in  the  period
1970-73,  plus  meet two-thirds  of the  finance  charges  on  new investments.
Managers  and  government  supervisors  agreed  that  goals  had  been  clarified,
transparency  of operations  improved,  and  government  reviewers  realized  that
increased  management  autonomy  did  not  automatically  mean increased  waste.
These  were  advances.
5.  But the  first  "oil  shock"  of 1973  led  to increased  costs  of
inputs,  inflation,  a snap  political  decision  to  build  several  nuelear
generating  plants  --  and  all  the  elaborately  prepared  ratios,  financial
projections  and  investment  targets  of the  CPs  suddenly  vere  out  of  date.
The  performance-guiding  capacity  of  a CP is tied  to the  accuracy  with  which
it  predicts  and  projects  key  financial  and  economic  variables. The  greater
the  discrepancy  between  assumed  and  actual  circumstances,  the  less  the  CP
can  serve  as a  detailed  guide  for  management  or evaluators.  A second
serious  and  recurring  problem  in  France  was  government's  refusal  to  permit
service  and  staff  reductions  and  price  increases  necessary  to cover  costs;
even  though  the  right  of  management  to impose  such  changes  was  either
implied  or directly  stipulated  in  the  agreements.  Faced  with  a widening
gap  between  the  projections  of the  CPs  and  actual  performance,  the  contract
with the  electricity  company  was  not  renewed. The  railway  contract  was
"extended"  for  a two  year  period,  but  not  immediately  re-negotiated.
6.  No other  CPs  were  signed  till  1978-79. Then  four  public
enterprises  vere  submitted  to  the  process: the  national  coal  company,  Air
France,  the  Ceneral  Maritime  Corporation,  and  --  the  only  repeater  from
phase  one --  the  railway. In  an  attempt  to  deal  with  the  difficulties
encountered  in the  first  group,  the  timetable  of the  second  group  of CPs
was  reduced  from  60 to  36  months. Annual  revision  was  built  in.  The  basic
goals  were  repeated: to  allow  enterprise  managment  more  freedom  to  set-iii-
prices,  ieduce  the  workforce,  end  unprofitable  product  lines  and  close
consistently  money  losing  operations.  Heightened  emphasis  was  placed  on
costing  out  and  compensating  for  socially  imposed  objectives.  Technical
innovations,  mainly  quantified  physical  and  financial  indicators  to  serve
as  measures  of performance  in  monopoly  utilities,  were introduced.
7.  Once  again,  implementation  got  off to  a  promising  start. The  coal
company  broke  even  in 1980,  for  the  first  time  since  1951. Railway
operations  became  more transparent  through  application  of the  performance
indicators.  The  shipping  company  was  committed  to  a reduction  in  its
workforce  by 25  percent,  and  a reduction  in its  fleet  by over  a third. (It
was threatened  with  liquidation  if  it  did  not  comply.) Air  France  had --
and  continues  to  have --  the  most  positive  CP experience.  As it  operated
in  basically  competitive  markets,  commercial  profitability  was  a  more
accurate  measurement  of  performance.  Thus,  goals  were  more  easily
quantified,  managerial  autonomy  more  easily  accorded,  and  deviations  from
commeiical  operation  more  easily  demarcated  --  and  compensated.  Targets
were  set  for  operational  growth  rates,  financial  objectives,  and  key
physical  indicators.
8.  The  Socialist  victory  in  1981  brought  a  halt  to the  implementation
of several  aspects  of the  CPs. Prices  were  not  raised  for  rail  services,  a
decision  was  made to  re-open  some  unprofitable  rail  lines  which  had  been
closed,  the  shipping  company  retained  its  full  workforce,  the  threat  to
liquidate  the  company  was  dropped. The  basic  assumptions  of the  second
group  of  CPs,  save  for  Air  France,  were simply  revised  from  above. The
Socialist  government  then  negotiated  some  further  ntraditional"  CPs  with
utilities  or social  service  providers  such  as  Gaz  de France,  the
electric.ty  company  (II),  Air  France  (II)  and  the  railway  (III). In 1983
the  government  also  negotiated  new-style  CPs  with  thirteen  industrial  and
manufacturing  SOEs. These  were,  supposedly,  guidance  and  orienting
mechanisms;  operational  tactics  were  to  be left  to  boards  and  managers.
These  CPs  placed  less  emphasis  on productivity  and  financial  targets  and
more  on  new  product  lines,  R &  D efforts,  market  shares,  and  general
harmonization  of the  efforts  of these  companies  with  the  general  goals  of
technological  modernization  and  enhanced  international  competitiveness.
9.  Despite  the  CPs,  net  transfers  to  all  public  enterprises  increased
from  12.8  billion  francs  in  1975  to  49.5  billion  francs  in  1982.  In 1984,
the  French  government  reviewed  their  experience  and  offered  five  main
lessons: (a)  keep  CPs  short  and  simple;  (b)  keep  them  flexible;  (c)  "the
existence  of the  contract-plan  is  more  important  than  its  content"  (meaning
that  the  formalized,  periodic  exchange  of  views  between  govern  ent  and  firm
were  more  important  than  the  quantified  indicators  or  performance  goals;
the  process  more  important  than  the  product);  (d)  the  weaker  the
performance  of  the  enterprise,  the  greater  the  difficulty  of  negotiating
and  implementing  a CP;  and  (e)  the  agreement  is  not  really  a contract  for
the  reason  that  the  state  cannot  be subjected  to legal  proceedings,  by -. he
enterprise,  in the  event  that  it fails  to  honor  its  obligations.-iv-
10.  There  have  been  no studies  comparing  the  performance  of French
SOEs  before  and  after  the  introduction  of  CPs;  nor  has a  comparison  been
made  between  firms  vith  and  vithout  CPs. Assessments  have tended  to  be of
a narrative,  qualitative  nature,  polling  the  attitudes  and  opinions  of
managers  and  government  supervisors  with  regard  to CPs;  they  have  concluded
that  concerned  personnel  support  stiongly  the  device. The  French  have
invested  considerable  resources  in  CPs.  In  most  instances,  performance  has
not improved  dramatically  (though  Air  France  1-las  performed  well  under  its
CP  regime). Too  much  was  expected  of the  process  at the  outset;  and  the
CPs inability  to  protect  the  SOE  from  the  effects  of  uncertainty  has  been  a
disappointment  to  4.ts  originators.  Recent  French  CPs  have  been  short,
general  documents,  outlining  general  policy  rather  than  specifying  the
details  of  performance.  The  apparent  failure  of the  mechanism  to stem  the
budgetary  outflow  has  led  the  managers  of the  process  to scale  down  their
ambitions  regarding  the  utility  of the  CP  device.
III.  Thé  Expérience  of  Developing  Cointries
Sene  2al
11.  The  CP  process  was introducted  to Senegal  in  1980,  in the
framewo*k  of  a  World  Bank  supported  technical  assistance  project  to the
parapublic  sector. The  first  five  performance  agreements  were  prepared
between  March  of 1981  and  January  of 1982. In 1984,  having  reviewed  the
first  experiences,  the  government  decided  to  renew  and  expand  the  process
in  nine  enterprises,  and  to  consider  the  possibility  of extending  the
device to many other concerns --  mostly utilities and agricultural
development  agencies,  but some  financial  and  industrial  enterprises  as
we]l. As of May  of 1988,  CPs  have  been  signed  in  nine  different  agencies.
Three  of the  nine  are  now in  their  second  CP,  meaning  that  twelve  sets  of
negotiations  have  been  concluded.  Senegal  thus  has  the  most  experience
with  CPs  of  any  country  other  than  France.
12.  The  Senegalese  make  a distinction  between  CPs  and  "lettres  de
mission"  (roughly  translatable  as "statements  of  objectives").  The former
are  used  in  p  -blic  utilities  and  industrial  enterprises;  the  latter  have
been  applied )  rural  and  regional  development  agencies,  the  commercial
nature  of  whi<  is  more  limited. Of the  first  group  of five  agreements
negotiated  in  381-82,  three  were  never  implemented  due  to the  lack  of
promised  investment  funds  (a  scarcity  heightened  by the  decision  of the
Vorld  Bank  not  to release  the  second  tranche  of  Senegal's  SAL  I).  The
first  CPs  followed  the  French  models,  stating  the  purpose  of the
enterprise,  projected  performance,  and  obligations  of the  government.  But
from  the  outset  the  Senegalese  agreements  had to  deal  with  an issue  which
was  not  a serious  problem  for  the  French;  i.e.,  the  question  of arrears
between  the  government  and  the  SOEs,  and  arrears  among  the  SOEs  themselves.
The  first  CP for  the  urban  transport  company,  for  example,  specified  that
government  would  settle  its  unpaid  bills,  and  previously  promised,  but
partially  paid  or  unpaid  subsidies.  This issue  was  and  remains  a  major-v..
problem. In  almost  every  case,  the  Senegalese  governmeat  has  committed
itself  in  a CP,  and  then  failed  to inject  promised  amouats  of equity,  or
failed  to settle  its  arrears  to  the  firm,  or failed  to  pay  off  subsidies
promised  in the  past,  or failed  to allow  price  increases,  etc.
13.  The  weakness  appeared  principally  to lie  in  inadequacies  of the
budgetary  review  and  resource  allocation  proc-sses.  That  is,  individual
CPs  specified  the  steps  needed  to  put  a fira  i  a sound  footing,
particularly  vith regard  to financing.  The  guvernment  largely  accepted  the
CPs  as drafted,  and  signed  them,  but  then  eventually  found  that  it  had
nowhere  near the  resources  necessary  to  cover  the  aggregate  commitments
made in  the  CPs. Resource  dispensers  then  resorted  to  partial  payments,
with the  sums  and  recipients  being  decided  by the  political  process. Thus,
the  quantified  goals  set  in  CPs  vere  all  too  often  set  aside;  CPs  proved
not  to  be successful  as  detailed  guides  on operations  at the  level  of the
firm. They  did,  however,  clarify  goals  and  stimulate  the  dialogue  between
mar.agement  and  the  state. This  was  beneficial;  and  associated  with the  CP
process  was  a series  of  reforms  --  management  information  systems,  improved
accounting  and  audit  systems,  the  introduction  of physical  and  financial
performance  indicators  --  which  lay  the  base  for  longer  term  improvements.
14.  The  second,  or  post-1984  generation  of Senegalese  CPs  has  been
constructed  to deal  with the  high  degree  of financial  uncertainty  which
prevails  in  the  country. With  Vorld  Bank  support,  efforts  have  been  made
to  strengthen  the  agency  in  the  Office  of the  President  which  is
responsible  for  SOE  reform  in  general  and  the  CP process  in  particular.
CPs  have included  sections  detailing  the  schedules  by which  the  government
would  clear  past  financial  commitments,  and  stipulating  what  services  vould
be reduced  in case  of  non-payment.  A  high-ranking  inter-ministerial  review
body  was  created  to  monitor  each  CP,  and  lobby  for  the  resolution  of
financial  problems,  if  and  when  they  should  occur. Most  of the  most  recent
CPs  include  statements  committing  the  government  to  ear-marking  sums  in the
annual  budget  to  cover  most if  not  all  of the  average  annual  payments  made
by government  for  the  good  or service  provided  (water,  electricity,
telephones,  etc.).
15.  The  CPs  have  produced  a  number  of  positive  and  beneficial  results.
Government  supervisors  and  enterprise  managers  alike  strongly  approve  of
and  support  the  CPs,  and  the  open  dialogue  process  which  creates  them. A
late  1986  Senegalese  assessment  stated  that  firms  with  CPs  show  better
personnel  management,  a superior  capacity  to  estimate  investment  needs,
more  success  in  gaining  approva;  for  rate  increases,  and  improved  relations
with  suppliers  of inputs  --  resulting,  in several  cases,  in  lower  prices
for  these  inputs. Another  study  suggested  that  enterprises  with CPs  had
higher  rates  of grovth  in  turnover  and  lower  labor  costs  than  firms  without
CPs. There  was  no difference  in  profit-making  or  rate  of return  on equity
invested.  (The  study  had a  number  of  methodological  shortcomings;  the
positive results --  modest as they  are --  must be interpreted  with
caution.)16.  Despite  advances,  the  number  and intensity  of  problems  are  greater
than  those  of the  benefits. For  example,  CPs  are  intended  to  promote
managerial  autonomy,  but in  Senegalese  practice,  managerial  latitude
remains  quite  limited. As  performance  evaluation  and  stimulation
mechanisms,  CPs  should  link  an  enterprise's  results  to  revards  and
sanctions  for  management  and  the  workforce. This  has  not  been done. Above
all, the  financial  problems  noted  above  have  not  been  overcome. The
government  has,  in all  too  many  cases,  consistently  been  unable  or
unwilling  to  meet  its  obligations,  despite  their  supposedly  contractual
nature,  and  despite  the  corrective  mechanisma  enacted.  The  fact  is that,
as in  France,  the  CPs  are  not  true  contracts;  the  enterprises  cannot  take
legal  action  in  case  of non-compliance.
17.  The  state's  failure  to  pay  became  so  widespread  that  SAL  III
(1987-88)  made  the  settlement  of the  state's  obligations,  as set  out  in
existing  CPs,  a condition  of second  tranche  release. Government  only
managed  to  meet  the  condition,  at the  very  last  moment,  by unilaterally
decreeing  that  the  sums  given  in the  existing  contracts  were  all  revised
downwards,  thus  allowing  the  state  to  claim  that  it  met the  financing
conditions.  This  tactic  negates  the  basic  principle  of tne  contract-plan
process;  open  negotiation  of nles  engagements  reciproques"  (mutual
commitments).  Most  of the  CPs  produced  have  been  technically  competent
documents.  But  despite  the  CPs  and  the  pressure  to  honor  them  coming  from
the  Bank,  neither  Office  of the  President  reviewers,  nor  Ministry  of
Finance  or Plan  reviewers  have  been  able  to aggregate  all  the  resources
committed  in the  individual  CPs  and  match  them  to  overall  resource
availability.  This is  not  to say  that  all  the  problems  are  the  fault  of
government;  it is  rather  that  the  CP  process  highlights  government's
deficieneies.
18.  Suggested  ways  to improve  the  situation  include:  divestiture  of
part  of the  sector,  allowing  the  government  to  concentrate  scarce  resources
on a smaller  number  of  enteprises;  overall  reduction  in  the  budget  of the
resources  devoted  to SOEs,  thus  forcing  a  priority  ranking  of  actions  (this
is  being  done  through  the  SAL  process);  involvement  of Treasury  officials
in  the  CP  negotiations;  publication  by the  Ministry  of Finance  of a formal
payment  timetable  for  each  CP;  procedures  whereby  the  Ministry  of Finance
at least  informs  SOEs  when  payments  will  be partial  or delayed;
simplification  of  paperwork  on  claims  and  payments;  closer  links  of SOE
payments  and  the  budget  cycle;  and,  finally,  the  formation  of new,  high-
level  committes  to  monitor  the  payments  process. All of these  avenues  are
being  explored.
19.  Senegalese  CPs  might  have  avoided  some  implementation  problems  had
there  been a stronger  supervisory  unit. Though  perfectly  placed  at the
apex  of  power  in  government,  the  Contract-Plan  Cell (or  Supervisory  Unit)
has  failed  to  exert  sufficient  pressure  on  budget  and  disbursement  offices
to  persuade  them  to  make  promised  payments  on time,  in  the  required
amounts. One  problem  has  been  rapid  turnover  of its  leadership,  a second
the  junior  status  and  lack  of experience  of its  cadre. In 1987,  the  unit-vii-
was reorganized  and  given  expanded  powers;  however,  it still  needs  internal
reinforcement  and  a clear  division  of  labor  with  other  supervising  units,
especially  in the  Ministry  of  Finance.
20.  The  primary  lesson  is  clear: contract-plans  cannot  by themselves
overcome  the  several,  serious  problems  of the  Senegalese  parapublic  sector.
Weak  budgeting  systems  (meaning  a lack  ot`  reliable  information  on  either
the  availability  or the  liquidity  of funds),  weak  agencies  of review  in  the
technical  and  financial  supervising  ministries,  und  weak  commitment  to  the
concept of financial  discipline --  the CP process highlights these
problems,  and  shows  that  they  are  not  all  the  prublem  of management;  but  it
does  not  eliminate  them. The  CP is  meant  to  be  both  binding  and  a plan.
But  the  Senegalese  experience  reveals  the  difficulty  of vinding  the
government,  and  of constructing  a plan  that  is  both  realistic  and
imple.-entable.  In miniature,  the  informational  shortcomings  of
comprehensive  planning  are  reproduced  in  the  CP  process.
21.  Senegal,  and  other  developing  countries  using  the  device,  cannot
easily  adopt  the  French  method  of solving  these  problems;  i.e.,  by moving
away  from  comprehensive  CPs  towards  sho,rter,  more  general  statements  of
intent  and  broad  policy. The  French  idea  is to  maximize  the  benefits  of
mutual  goal-setting  and  formalized  dialogue,  which  the  process  provides,
vithout  becoming  bogged  down  in  specific  numbers  and  quantities.  Senegal
is  obliged  to retain  a  greater  degree  of complexity  in its  contracts.
There  the  trend  has  been  to  use  shorter  intervals  of  CP review  and
modification,  and  to strengthen  the  reviewing  agencies,  in  an  effort  to
deal  with the  prevailing  high  degree  of uncertainty.  Irrespective  of
continuing  problems,  the  World  Bank  continues  to  be heavily  involved  in the
CP  process. The  reasoning  is that  the  CP's  emphasis  on clear  goals  and  on
increased  transparency  of operations  could  and  should,  in the  medium  term,
render  important,  low-cost  assistance  in  the  search  for  more  productive  and
efficient  public  enterprises.  CPs  cannot  make  governments  manage  more
rationally  their  resources;  but  they  can  provide,  and  are  providing  in
Senegal,  rationalist  reformers  with  the  ammunition  to  structure  and
legitimate  reform.
Recommendations  for  Senegal
22.  The  CP  process  has  little  meaning  if  the  State  consistently  makes
unrealistic  financial  promises  which  cannot  be  kept. Three  sets  of action
should  be taken.
(i)  The  cost-reduction  and  cost-recovery  measures  already
set  forth  in  existing  CPs  must  be enforced.
(ii)  The links  between  the  resource  allocation  --  i.e.,  the
budgetary --  system and the CP process should be
strengthened.
(iii)  A strengthened  capacity  within  government,  particularly
in the  Mintstry  of Finance,  to  project  total  resource
availability,  and  to  rank  technically  priority  areas  for
expenditure,  is  essential.-viii-
Otheg  DeveloRint  Countries
23.  The  CP or a related  mechanism  is  in  use (or  in  preparation)  in  a
number  of  other  countries;  most,  but  not  all  francophone  African. Many  of
these  CPs  have  been  required  or requested  in  Bank  projects  or adjustment
operations;  most of them  have  been  prepared  with  technical  assistance
personnel  paid  by funds  provided  by World  Bank  credits. Benin.  Burundi.
Congo.  Cote  d'Ivoire.  Gambia.  Madagascar.  Mal.,  Morocco.  Niger  and  Tunisia:
all  have  CPs in  place  or in  preparation  in  Bank-related  operations.  In
none  of these  cases  has  the  CP  process  been in  place  for  a sufficient
period  of time  to  permit  a full  assessment.
24.  Still,  the  Moroccan  case  offers  some  encouraging  signs. Learning
from  a trial  run  in their  national  airline,  which  had  a CP from  1982-84
(but  was  never  re-newed>,  the  Moroccans  are  presently  installing  CPs  in  six
major  SOES,  including  the  national  electricity  company,  the  water  company
and  the  railroad. Two  of the  six,  including  the  water  company,  were  signed
in  December  of 1987;  the  remaining  four  are  scheduled  for  signature  by the
end  of 1988. Completion  of all  six  is  a  condition  of second  tranche
release  of the  World  Bank's  Public  Enterprise  Restructuring  Loan (PERL)  to
Morocco.
25.  The failure  to  honor  financial  obligations  was  a  major  problem
with  the  airline  CP.  The  clearance  of arrears  and  the  imposition  of
financial  discipline  are  the  goals  of the  PERL. Attention  to  financial
details  thus  occupies  a central  position  in  the  Moroccan  CP process. But
neither  the  involved  government  staff  nor  enterprise  officials  regard  CPs
as ultimate  solutions  or  as rigid  and  inflexible  documents. They  are  seer.
as first  steps  in  a lengthy,  experimental  process,  during  which  both sides
will  learn. No consultants,  foreign  or domestic,  have  been involved.
Moroccan  planners  feel  that  it  is  better  to  have imperfect  documents,  the
preparation/learning  benefits  of  which  accrue  to  Moroccans,  then
technically perfect CPs, prepared --  and understood and supported --  only
by consultants.
26.  Though  the  first  two  CPs  signed  in  the  framework  of PERL  have  only
been  in  effect  for  a few  months,  the  state  bas  cleared  the  arrears
situation  in  these  two  firms,  for  the  first  time  in  the  1980s. Enterprise
officials  attribute  this  to  the  CP  process,  which  gives  quasi-legal  force
to  the  state's  promise  to  pay,  and  to the  firm  and  persistent  action  of the
supervising  agency,  which  has  actively  pressured  the  Treasury  to  honor
contracted  obligations.  This  is  a substantial  accomplishment.  A concern
is  that  neither  CP  eliminated  or  drastically  revised  the  powers  of the
accounting  agent  or financial  controller;  officl-'s  of the  Ministry  of
Finance  who  reside  permanently  in  each  SOE  and  *.,se  approval  is  necessary
--  and sometimes difficult to obtain --  for expenditures.  ': vas  thought
and  hoped  that  the  CPs  would  lighten  their  role;  this  has  not  yet  happened.-ix-
27.  In  both  France  and  developing  countries  CPs  have  been  vell
crafted. Problems  have  been  more ln  implementation  than  in  design. CPs
have  not  proven  to  be particularly  good  at restoring  basic  health  to
enterprises  ln  criais,  to  the  point  where  the  French  --  and increasingly,
the  World  Bank  --  nov  recommend  that  enterprises  first  be rehabilitated,
then  submitted  to the  CP process. Developing  country  usera  of CPs  have
more  often  tried  to  apply  the  device  to  ailing  firms,  vith  disappointing
results. The  CP is  best  used  to  regularize  and  improve  the  framework  for
firms  operating  in  basically  commercia'  situations,  endowed  with  decent
management  and  sound  financial  and  reporting  procedures.  It  is  not  the
mechanism  of choice  for  healing  a sick  company.
28.  The  CP  process  requires  a strong,  vell-placed  supervisory  agency
to  assist  in  the  preparation  of the  agreement,  review  implementation,  and
especially  push for  the  proper  fulfillment  of the  contract. A difficult
task  is finding  the  proper  balance  between  empowering  the  managers  through
the  CPs,  and  at the  same  time  endowing  an oversight  agency  with sufficient
"clout"  to  enforce  the  CPs. The  hope  of the  creators  of the  CP process  was
that  it  would  lead  to a  reduction  in the  powers  of government  supervising
agencies. This  has  not  come  about,  first,  because  of  a normal  reluctance
of governments  to  diminish  their  preogatives,  and  second,  due  to  the
unforseen  need  to  have  a  strong  voice  inside  government  pushing  for  the
honoring  of commitments.  The  latter  is  legitimate,  the  former  unwarrented:
CPs  should  replace  normal  control  agents  and  procedures,  not  be added  to
them.
29.  Despite  the  name,  CPs  have  not  proven  to  be legally  enforceable
contracts. If governments  are  not  legally  bound,  what is  the  status  of the
obligations  imposed  on the  enterprises?  Persistent  non-compliance  with
terma  of the  CPs  has  discouraged  and  demotivated  enterprise  managers. A
frequently  suggested  reform  is  requesting  or  requiring  governments  to treat
the  terms  of the  CPs  as  legally  contracted,  with  either  party  being  able  to
enforce  compliance  through  the  courts. This  is  unrealistic.  Governuents
already  have  the  pover  to impose  their  will  on  enterprises,  and  none  has
shown  any  villingness  to  allow  itself  to  be sued. Perhaps  the  term
"contract"  should  be eliminated  from  the  process;  the  more  accurate  term
would  be "performance  agreement,"  a title  already  used  in  Latin  America  and
anglophone  Africa.
30.  Overall,  the  CP  device  i  of  value,  but its  benefits  have  been  a
bit  oversold. Government  officials  and  World  Bank  staff  contemplating  its
introduction  should  thus  exercise  caution. Ambitions  should  be modest.
CPs  should  be introduced  in  one  or two  test  cases. They  should  be kept
short  and  simple. Emphasis  should  be placed  on goal  clarification,  an
increase  in  managerial  autonomy,  and  open  negotiating  between  government
and  management.  CP use  should  not  be a  matter  of  conditionality  in  Bank
adjustment  operations;  at least  until  the  process  has  been  tested  in-
country  and  shown  to  be workable  and  beneficial.Contract-Plans:
An Assessment  of  Thoir  Utilitv  as Performance  Imorovement
Mechanisms  in  Public  Enterprises
I.  Introdtiction
A.  The  Issue
1.  Contract-plansl  are  negotiated  agreements  between  governments,
acting  as  owners  of a  public  enterprise,  and  the  enterprise  itself. The
essential  idea  of  a contract-plan  is  that  the  rights  and  duties  of  both
parties  are  clearly  spelled  out. The  concept  was  devised  to  attack  the
problems  of  unclear  or shifting  objectives,  insufficient  autonomy  of
managers,  and  excessively  constraining  control  systems,  problems  perceived
as  major  hindrances  to  public  enterprise  efficiency  and  productivity.
2.  A contract-plan  sets  out,  on the  basis  of  negotiations  between
government  representatives  and  enterprise  managers,  the  intentions,
obligations  and  responsibilities  of the  two  parties. Its  period  of
activity  extends  beyond  the  budgeting  cycle,  covering  three  to five  years.
A typical  contract-plan  specifies  enterprise  objectives,  in  terms  of
1/  Terminology  varies  from  country  to  country  or from  period  to  period
within  the  same  country. These  agreements  are  also  known  as enterprise
contracts,  program  contracts,  performance  agreements,  or  action  plans.
The underlying principle --  mutual specification  of rights and
responsibilities  by government  and  public  enterprise  --  is  the  same  in  all
cases.-2-
desired  overall  socio-economie  impact,  production  goals,  and/or  quantities
and  quality  of service  to  be provided  during  the  period  of the  agreement.
It  defines  poli4ies  and  parameters  vith  regard  to such  items  as  numbers
employed,  size  and  growth  of the  enterprise's  wage  bill,  and  social,  or
non-commercial  activities.  Many  recent  contract-plans  stipulate  the
physical  and  financial  indicators  which  will  measure  enterprise
performance.  What  distinguishes  the  contract-plan  from  a set  of directives
imposed  by the  owners  of a firm,  or from  a corporate  plan  produced  by the
firm  on its  own,  is  that  it  also  spells  out  the  obligations  of,  and
limitations  on,  the  government.  That  is,  contract-plans  normally  define
what  management  may  do  without  government's  review  and  approval,  what
prices  the  enterprise  can  charge  for  its  goods  or services,  and  how, and
under  what  conditions,  these  prices  will  fluctuate.  Many  establish  the
principle  that  government  will  compensate  the  enterprise  for  costs  incurred
in  fulfilling  non-commercial  objectives,  and  specify  the  means  and
mechanisms  by  which  the  compensation  will  be made. A typical  contract-plan
lays  out  the  enterprise's  financing  and  investment  program,  noting  the
amount  the  enterprise  must  generate  internally.  the  amount  to  come from
government  subsidy  or equity  injections,  and  the  amount  to  be raised  by
credit,  with  or  without  government  guarantee.
3.  Historically,  elements  or  precursors  of the  contract-plan  process
can  be found  in  a  number  of countries,  but  the  device  first  came  to
prominence  and  fruition  in  France  in  the  late  1960s  and  early  1970s. From
1970  to  the  present,  a group  of  eight  of that  country's  largest  and  most
important  (from  several  points  of  view,  including  degree  of  burden  on the
budget)  public  enterprises  have  been  submitted  to  varying  forms  of  what the-3-
French  call  "the  contractualization  process." The  test  cases,  in  the
energy,  transport  and  utility  sub-sectors,  have  all  been  monopolies  or
oligopolies  with  heavy  social  service  responsibilities.  In 1983,  following
the  Socialist  electoral  victory,  thirteen  further  contract-plans  were
concluded  with  industrial  public  enterprises,  a few  of which  had long  been
in  the  public  sector,  but  most  of  which  had  been  nationalized  by the
Mitterand  government  in  1981-82. The  results  of  both  of these  experiences
have  been  judged  as  moderately  positive,  though  the  criteria  used to  make
this  assessment  have  been  more institutional/managerial  and  qualitative
than  economic  and  quantitative  in  nature. Finally,  French  analysts  are  at
pains  to  point  out  the  difficulties  of  determining  the  exact  relation
between  shifts  in  enterprise  economic  and  financial  results,  and  the
presence  or absence  of a contract-plan  (henceforth,  CP).
4.  Given  the  provenance  of the  mechanism,  it is  not  surprising  that
the  developing  countries  which  have  attempted  to  borrow  or adopt  the
contract-plan  have  been,  in the  overwhelming  main,  francophone.  The first
recorded  attempt  to  export  the  process  vas in  1973,  when  negotiations
produced  a CP for  a Tunisian  public  textile  firm. For  unknown  reasons,  the
agreement  was  never  signed  or implemented.  But,  starting  in Senegal  in
1980,  and  spreading  through  most  of francophone  Africa  up to the  present,
the  CP has  been  adopted,  or is in  the  process  of  being  prepared,  in  roughly
seventy-five  public  enterprises  in ten  different  francophone  Sub-Saharan
countries.  The  process  is  advanced  in  Morocco,  where  six  CPs  are  presently
being  installed  in  a  group  of the  most  important  PEs. The  device  is  again
being  applied  in  Tinisia. In  many  of these  instances,  World  Bank-4-
structural  adjustment  or  public  enterprise  reform  programs  have supported,
and  increasingly  required,  the  installation  of CPs.
5.  Variations  on the  CP theme  are  in  preparation  in  three  anglophone
African  countries  as  well. Outside  the  African  continent,  the  necessity  to
improve  the  performance  of  public  enterprises  has  combined  with the  hope
that  the  CP  or something  like  it  would  effect  desperately  needed
improvements,  where  so  many  other  procedures  and  reforms  have failed. This
has  led  to  the  adoption,  or  consideration  of  a CP  process  in  Argentina
("program  agreements,"  in  negotiation  and  preparation  in the  transport
sector),  Mexico,  Bangladesh,  India  ("memoranda  of understanding"  in six
major  enterprises  in the  energy,  industrial  and  engineering  sectors),  and
inquiries  into  the  prospect  of  using  the  CP in  a number  of other  countries.
Worldwide,  there  are  over  a hundred  contract-plans  in  operation  or advanced
preparation,  and  an  equal,  probably  larger  number,  under  active
consideration.
6.  The  purpose  of the  present  paper  is  to examine  the  contract-plan
experience;  to determine  what  they  were  designed  to  achieve,  how  they  have
been  constructed,  where  they  have  been  applied,  with  what  results  --
economic, financial and  institutional  --  and  what lessons have been
learned. The  study's  major  concern  is  the  utility  of the  device  as a  way
to improve  performance  in  developing  country  public  enterprises.  Most  of
the  available  information  on that  subject  comes  from  Sub-Saharan  Africa,
much  of it from  Senegal,  the  country  most  experienced  in  its  use. The
study  thus  examines  in  detail  the  Senegalese  experience,  and  reviews  more
briefly  the  CP  process  in  other  African  countries,  Morocco  and  India.-5-
However,  the  seminal  nature  of the  French  experience  necessitates  that  the
first  order  of  business  be a review  of the  CP  process  in  that  country.
B.  The  French  Experience
7.  Throughout  the  less-developed  world,  governments  have  relied
heavily  on  public  enterprises 2 as tools  to  accomplish  their  developmental
objectives.  The  use  of  public  enterprises  has  not  been  limited  to
developing  countries;  most  developed  countries  have  had,  and  retain,
substantial  PE sectors  of great  economic  and  financial  importance. 3
French  PEs,  before  1981,  employed  12  percent  of salaried  workers  outside
agriculture,  contributed  13  percent  of  value  added,  and  accounted  for  30
percent  of gross  fixed  capital  formation.  All  three  ratios  rose
substantially  after  the  nationalizations  of 1981-82;  all  three  have
declined,  perhaps  to less  than  1981  values,  following  the  1986-87
privatization  of thirty  PEs  --  with  a further  thirty-five  supposedly  to
follow.  Nonethelesse  even when (or if) all scheduled  privatizations are
completed,  the  French  PE  sector  will  still  account  for  a  higher  percentage
of GDP  than  in  most  other  industrialized  countries.
Z/  These  are  also  known  as state-owned  enterprises,  parastatals,  public
corporations,  or government-invested  corporations.
i/  Worldwide,  public  enterprises  account  for  about  10  percent  of  GDP;  to
give  an idea  of the  LDC's  heavier  use  of the  device,  note  that  in  Sub-
Saharan  Africa  the  figure  is  roughly  double  the  world  norm.-6-
8.  The  French  public  enterprise  sector  came  into  existence  following
World  War I,  and  undervent  surges  of  expansion  in  1936  (the  Popular  Front),
1945-46  (the  reaction  to  World  Var  II),  and  1981-82  (the  nationalizations
following  the  election  of  the  Socialist  government).  There  was  no dramatic
shift  of  policy  in the  period  1947-67,  yet  the  sector  expanded  steadily  in
that  period  as  many  public  enterprises  created  a large  number  of subsidiary
or affiliated  companies.  In 1966,  the  Gaullist  governuent,  increasingly
concerned  with  the  poor  financial  performance  and  particularly  the  large
deficits  of the  monopoly  public  service  enterprises,  commissioned  a  high
level  panel  to review  the  situation.  The  result  vas the  Nora  report  of
1967  --  named after the chairman of the commission, Simon Nora --  which
first  suggested  the  concept  of  the  contract-plan  (at  that  juncture  callec
the  program-contract).
The  Nora  Report
9.  The  Nora  report  portrayed  the  deficiencies  of the  French  public
enterprise  sector  in  critical  terms  and  tone  familiar  to those  working  on
the  subject  in  developing  countries  today. It  deplored  the  poor  state  of
enterprise  accounts  and  budgeting  systems,  the  enterprises'  inability  to
finance  their  own  investments,  the  ineffective,  time-consuming,  dirigiste
systems  of  government  control  and  supervision,  the  lack  of  clarity  of
objectives,  the  government's  failure  to award  enterprises  sufficient  or
timely  tariff  increases;  and  the  resulting  general  transfer  of the  costs  of
running  these  enterprises  from  the  users  of the  goods  or services  they
produced  to the  taxpaying  public  at large.-7-
10.  The  dual  prescription  for  reform  offered  by Nora  vas  equally
familiar: it  vas  necessary  to clarify  objectives  and  set  commercial
profitability  as a fundamental  aim. Principal  sub-objectives  vould  be to
increase  management's  autonomy,  and  improve  State/enterprise  supervisory
arrangements.  The  State  should  no longer  supervise  by  means  of direct
... commands,  by a  prioLi  authoiization,  or by taking  day  to  day  decisions
best  left  to  managers,  but  rather  by the  clear  setting  of  criteria  and  of
the  rules  of the  game." It  vas  recommended  that  the  costs  imposed  by
social  service  obligations  be determined,  and  compensation  mechanisms
created. A distinction  vas  made  between  public  enterprises  operating  in
competitive  markets  and  monopolies;  the  former  should  be lightly  supervised
while  the  latter  needed  stricter  controls. Only  the  latter  would  be
subjected  to the  CP  process. But,  argued  the  report,  all  enterprises,
including  monopolies,  could  benefit  from  increased  autonomy.
il.  The  report  devised  the  concept  of "engagements  reciproques"  --
mutual  cwmmitments  or obligations  --  which  lies  at the  heart  of  the  CP
process. The  report  suggested  that  through  negotiations  the  two  parties
would  reach  a binding  agreement  stating  what  the  enterprise  would
accomplish  and  what the  State  vould  do  --  and  not  do --  to  guide,  support
and  evaluate  the  accomplishments.  The  result  would  be an  appropriate
balance  between  needed  enterprise  autonomy  and  government's  legitimate
right  to  assure  accountability.  Contracts  were  to  be  used to  set
appropriate  levels  of  enterprise  inputs  and  outputs,  the  amounts  of capital
subvent_ons,  borroving  limits,  tariff  parameters  and  vage  bills,  and
determine  the  margin  of latitude  of  enterprise  managers  and  directors.  The-8-
reasoning  was that  if  goals  were  clearly  set,  government  could  lighten  its
a  prlori  controls. The  social  costs  of the  operation  would  become  more
transparent,  and  this  would  make  easier  the  task  of  evaluating  the  firm.
The  expectation  was that  as  public  awarenesa  grew  regarding  the  real  costs
of the  enterprise,  then  pressure  would  grow  for  the  reduction  of these
costs. A higher  percentage  of the  operating  costs  might  then  be shifted  to
users. This,  in  turn,  would  create  pressure  to  increase  competition
between  public  and  private  enterprises.  The  report  thus  envisaged  the
evolution  of a  drastically  changed  public  sector  "mentality,"  where  costs
--  especially  personnel costs --  would be reduced, technology  would be
modernized,  and  management  methods  would  change. The  contract  process  was
to  serve  a key  role  in  bringing  about  this  set  of improvements.
ImDlementation - First Phase
12.  Preparatory  negotiations  for  CPs  started  in 1969. The  first  two
CPs  were  signed  in 1969-70,  with the  national  electricity  company,  and  the
national  railway  (respectively,  Electricite  de  France  or  EDF,  and  the
Societe  National  des  Chemins  de Fer  or SNCF). Each  was  suppcsed  to  remain
in  force  for  five  years. The  1970  contract-plan  for  EDF  was  considered  as
the  model  CP.  It  spelled  out  a system  of lighter,  more  flexible  government
supervision  which  reduced  the  powers  of the  permanent  representatives,
within  the  firm,  of the  ministries  of Finance  and  Energy  (representatives
of the  financial  and  technical  supervising  ministries  are  present  in  every
French  PE;  their  presence  slows  decision-making  and  hinders  the  seizing  of
opportunities).  The  CP supported  expansion  by EDF  into  nuelear  power-9.
generation.  An early  draft  called  for  large  rate  increases  which  would
allow  EDF  to  cover  the  heavy  investment  costs  and  still  turn  a  profit.
Analysts  note  that  it  was  the  Ministry  of  Finance  which  insisted  that  the
final  agreement  hold  price  increases  to less  than  increases  in  the  CPI
(similar  to the  RPI  minus  x pricing  arrangement  used  in  privatized  British
monopolies  at  present).  Nonetheless,  from  1970  to 1973,  the  selling  price
of  electricity  was sufficient  to cover  the  variable  costs  of EDF's
production,  plus  meet  two-thirds  of the  finance  charges  on new  investments.
13.  But  the  1973  first  "oil  shock"  led  to  vastly  increased  costs  of
major  inputs,  economy-wide  inflation,  and  a snap  political  decision  to
increase  sharply  the  capacity  to  generate  electricity  by nuclear  reactors
---  which  in  turn  meant  a spate  of loans  and  subsidies  to EDF  not  called  for
in the  CP.  In the  altered  circumstances,  it  became  apparent  that  many  of
the  elaborately  prepared  numbers  and  ratios  in the  CP suddenly  were  dated
and irrelevant.
14.  In the  first  SNCF  CP,  signed  in 1971,  the  goals  were to reduce  the
railway  system's  deficit  by cutting  staff  by 15  percent,  and  by giving  the
enterprise  considerable  latitude  on rate  setting. The  full  achievement  of
all  the  CP's  objectives  would  have  substantially  diminished  the  rate  of
loss  but  not turned  the  SNCF  into  a profitable  company. But  even  the
modest  financial  goals  set  in  the  first  CP  were  not  attained. This  was
partly  due --  again  --  to  unanticipated  increases  in  the  costs  of  major
inputs. An important  second  factor  was  a lack  of  political  willingness,
when  the  crucial  moments  came,  to tolerate  the  service  and  staff  reductions
and  price  hikes  necessary  to  cover  costs. Third  was  the  railway's-10-
inability  to compete  with truckers  in  goods  transporting,  which  reduced
demand  for  rail  service  below  projected  levels.4
15.  The  SNCF  CP  was  nonetheless  extended  for  an extra  two  years,
running  through  to  1977. The  rail  system's  financial  difficulties  were  not
resolved,  as government  repeatedly  cited  regional  development  policies  or
possible  social  tensions  as justifications  for  inactivity  on  price
increases  and  cost  reduction  measures,  even  though  these  had  been  agreed  on
in  the  CP.
16.  Despite  the  bleak  picture  with  regard  to  financial  results,
assessments  of the  first  CP experience  were  positive. All those  involved,
enterprise  managers  and  government  supervisors  alike,  agreed  that  the
institutionalized  CP negotiating  process  did  lead  to clarified  objectives
and  increased  understanding  of the  constraints  operating  on the  other
party. Budgetary  aid  to the  CP'ed  enterprises  declined  by 20  percent  in
the  period  1969-72;  though  it  then  shot  up to  historically  high levels
following  the  first  oil  shock. This  was  important,  for  the  budgetary
burden  issue  is the  one  which  most interested  the  French  government  (and
A/  This  section  on the  French  experience  utilizes  the  following  sources:
Michel  Durupty,  Les  Entreprises  Publiques  - Tome  2 - Gestion/Controle
(Paris: Presses  Universitaires  de  France,  1986); J. de Chalander,  IGF,
Ministere  de  l'Economie,  des  Finances  et  de la  Privatisation,  "Les
Relations  entre  l'Etat  et les  entreprises  publiques  en France,"
mimeographed,  Paris,  1984,  and  J. P.  Anastassopoulos  et J. P.  Nioche,
Entreprises  Publiaues: Exoeriences  Com»arees  (Paris: F.N.E.G.E.,  1982,
especially  Chapitre  1,  pp.  19-55.-11-
remains  lh& issue  for  most  developing  country  governments  presently  using
the  process). Transparency  vas  somewhat  increased,  and  government
controllers  recognized  that  "management  autonomy  does  not  inevitably  mean
vaste." 5 These  vere  substantial  achievements.  Still,  much  of the  optimism,
or idealism,  with  regard  to  forward  budgeting  and  financial  projections  --
key  considerations  in  a process  which  projected  production,  costs  and
investments  for  five  years  into  the  future  --  had  faded  in the  light  of the
unforeseen  changes  in  the  world  economy  starting  in  1973. Some  observers
outside  of  government  thtus  called  the  process  into  question  on the  basis
that  any  CP  vas  only  as good  as one's  ability  to  prediet  accurately  the
economic  future. It  was  clear  that  that  ability  was  poorly  developed.
Others  felt  that  the  first  experience,  especially  in  the  SNCF  case,  showed
that  government's  power  inevitably  overwhelmed  the  enterprise;  that  is,
when  there  was  a dispute  or a  crisis,  it  was  government's  position  which
prevailed. This  led  some  to  believe  that  the  concept  was  mis-named  and
perhaps  unworkable.  None  of the  observers  discussed  the  time  or resources
devoted  to the  preparation  of the  CPs,  which  must  have  been  considerable.
A noteworthy  fact  is  that  neither  of the  two  first  phase  CPs  vzs
immediately  renewed  (though  the  SNCF  CP  was,  as  noted,  prolonged,  and  then
went into  second  phase  negotiations).
Imolementation  - Second  Phase
17.  The  period  1973  to  1977  was  one  of acute  economic  crisis  and
uncertainty  during  which  the  CP process  was  not  expanded;  but  as a  modicum
l/  Durupty,  p. 368.-12-
of stability  returned  the  French  government  again  turned  its  attention  to
contracts. Two  follow,up  committees  to the  Nora  body  vere  formed. They
issued  reports,  judged  to  be "less  imaginative  and  more  pragmatic"  than
that  of  Nora,  which  mnodified  the  CP process  in light  of lessons  learned.
The  first  change  was  that  of scaling  down  the  time  frame  of CPs;  from  60 to
36  months,  with  greater  provision  for  annual  revision  as and  when
circumstances  altered. The  second  change  was that  of tightening  the  foeus
of the  CPs,  which  henceforth  vere  to  be  based  on three  principles:
- transparence  of social  transfers;  letting  the  public  know  whc  is  paying
for  what;
- transparence  of resuli-s  of PEs;  by publishing  and  publicizing  performance
statistics;
- transparence  on investments,  which  henceforth  had  to  be justified  in
cost/benefit  terms.
The  overall  goals  were  repeated: to increase  autonomy  of management,  allow
the  enterprises  more freedom  to  set  prices,  reduce  the  workforce,  end
unprofitable  product  lines,  and  close  consistently  money  losing  factories
or operations.  Heightened  emphasis  was  placed  on costing  out  and
compensating  for  socially  imposed  operations.  To emphasize  the  shift  in
focus,  these  agreements  were  given  a  new  name:  "enterprise  contracts."
18.  Four  of the  supposedly  new  style  (in  reality,  they  did  not  differ
dramatically  from  the  earlier  agreements)  CPs  were  negotiated  in  the  period
1977-79;  all  were  signed  in 1978  or 1979. The  companies  vere:  the
national  coal  company,  Air  France,  the  General  Maritime  Corporation  and  --
the only repeater from  phase one --  the SNCF.  The coal company,
Charbonnages  de France,  vas  given  a freer  hand  in  pricing. This  was-13-
combined  with  a strong  demand  for  coal  as  oil  prices  maintained  high
levels;  these  factors  led  to the  company  breaking  even  in 1980,  after
adding  in  government's  subsidy  (since  1951,  the  accounts  had  not  been  in
balance  even  with  the  subsidy). Company  managers  hoped  that  the  CP  would
"put  an end  to  the  arbitrary  regime"  under  which  they  had labored. The
expectation  was  that U  ks_t  evaluation  of  results  would  henceforth  replace
detailed  «  ante  reviews  and  approvals.  Management  wished  to  gain  the
power  to run  the  operation  as a commercial  firm;  government's  role  would  be
to  provide  the  company  with  access  to sufficient  investment  capital  to
allow  it  to  modernize  key  facilities.  But  with  the  election  of the
socialists  in 1981  the  company's  top  management  was  changed. The  new
managers  simply  ignored  the  conditions  of the  CP negotiated  by the  previous
regime,  and  the  new  government  reversed  previous  decisions  to  close  several
old,  unproductive,  costly  mines. In  the  last  year  of the  CP,  government
subsidies  to  the  coal  company  grew  rapidly.
19.  The second  CP negotiated  with  the  SNCF  gave  limited  power  of  price
setting  to  enterprise  management.  The  major  innovation  of this  particular
document  was its  use  of quantified  performance  indicators,  physical  and
financial,  to  be  used in  the  evaluation  of results  and  the  rewarding  of
management.  This  feature  has  been  widely  adopted  in  subsequent  CPs,  in
France  and  elsewhere. But  management's  latitude  in  price  setting  was
marginal,  and in  a  most  important  cost  area,  that  of personnel,  management
was  powerless. (French  CPs  do not  normally  Lackle  head  on  numbers  or  pay
rates  of  personnel;  except  in  the  case  discussed  in  the  following  paragraph
these  matters  are  handled  by national  conventions.  The  failure  to  deal
directly  with  personnel  issues  has  been  a deficiency  of the  program.) In-14-
the  first  two  years  of the  CP  several  uneconomic  passenger  lines  were
closed,  which  led  to an improvement  in  the  financial  picture. Here  as
well,  however,  the  victory  of the  socialists  led  to  a government  order  to
freeze  fares  and  to reopen  most  of the  closed  lines. Levels  of
subsidization  grew;  the  financial  situation  worsenad.
20.  The  shipping  company  CP  was  more  of a restructuring  plan  than  a
contract;  that  is,  it  vas  a statement  of  directives,  along  with  a  warning
of  what  vould  happen  if  performance  did  not  improve. In  essence,  the
company  vas  viewed  by government  in  1979  as  having  too  many  advantages  and
workers,  and  the  CP's  goal  was  to suppress  the  former  and --  in  a rare  move
--  reduce  the  number  of the  latter. A capital  sibsidy  was  specified  and
the  compensation  policy  for  the  money-losing  Corsican  service  was
established;  but the  main  components  of the  CP  were  the  directives  to
reduce  the  workforce  by 25  percent,  and  reduce  the  number  of ships  from  98
to 36.  The  CP stipulated  that  if the  goals  were  not  clearly  met in  three
years,  the  government  could  exercise  a right  to sell  or liquidate  the  firm.
Yet again,  the  1981  election  changed  government  policy;  the  CP was
essentially  abandoned  and  the  company  allowed  to  survive,  apparently  with
the  same  number  of  workers.
21.  The CP process in  Air France  was --  and continues  to be --  a much
more  positive  experience.  This  vas  the  first  CP in  an enterprise  operating
in  basically  competitive  markets. Largely  because  of this  factor,  the
negotiated  CP gave  the  airline  a  greater  degree  of  managerial  autonomy  than
was  accorded  other  firms. Since  commercial  profitability  vas a fairly
accurate  measure  of  Air  France's  success,  the  goals  of the  CP could  be-15-
specified  with  greater  precision. The  deviations  from  commercial  operation
vere  also  easily  demarcated:  the  use  of inefficient  Caravelles  and  the
Concorde,  the  splitting  of  Parisian  service  between  Orly  and  Charles  de
Gaulle  airports,  the  maintenance  of  certain  lines  with  uneconomic  load
factors  --  the  agreed-upon  compensation  for  these  non-commercial  activities
imposed  on  Air  France  could  be and  was  precisely  calculated.
22.  The  targets  set  in the  CP for  growth  in  the  level  of operations,
financial  objectives,  and  for  the  key  physical  indicator  of number  of
flight  hours  per  year,  by aircraft  type,  were  met  or exceeded  in 1978  and
1979,  and  vere  just  short  of targets  in 1980. The  result  vas that  the  firm
turned  a  profit  in 1980;  "one  of the  very few  European  airline  companies  to
present  positive  financial  results"  in  that  difficult  year.  It is  not
clear  from  available  documentation  how  the  government's  "capital  endowment"
to  Air  France  figures  in  the  calculation  of  profitability.  Nor  can  one
gauge  the  role  of factors  outside  the  control  of  management,  such  as the
reduction  in the  price  of fuel. Nonetheless,  what is  clear  is  that
fitancial  targets  set  in  the  CP  were  met  or exceeded  in  each  of the  three
years  covered  in  the  period. This  was  enough  to term  the  process  a
success. Air  France  has  had  its  CP renewed  every  three  years  since.
Third  Phase: 1981  to the  Present
23.  After  1981,  CPs  of a  more  or less  traditional  type  continued  to  be
installed  in  several  of  the  monopoly  or oligopoly  public  enterprises  with
heavy  social  service  obligations:  Gaz  de  France,  EDF,  Air  France,  and ---16-
for  the  third  time,  following  lengthy  and  difficult  negotiations  --  the
SNCF. But  in the  first  half  of  1983  the  Socialist  government  also
installed  what it  insisted  vas  a quite  different  type  of  CP in  thirteen
industrial  and  manufacturing  public  enterprises,  several  of  which  had  been
nationalized  in 1981-82.6  To show  that  the  new  contracts  in the  industries
differed  from  past  activities  in the  utilities,  the  agreements  were,
finally,  given  the  name  by  which  they  are  today  generally  known,  "contract-
plans." In  these  CPs,  enterprises  were to  be given  only  guidance  and
policy  orientation  of a long-term,  strategic  nature;  operational  tactics
were,  in  principle,  left  to  managers  and  boards.  (But  similar  promises  had
been  made  concerning  the  earlier  processes.)  The  documents  drafted  did
place  much  less  emphasis  on productivity  and  financial  targets;  they
stressed  instead  the  creation  of  new  product  lines,  areas  in  which  the
firms  would  concentrate  their  R&D  efforts,  the  maintenance  or regaining  of
a  set  amount  of  market  share,  and,  in  general,  harmonization  of the  efforts
of this  group  of state  enterprises  working  in  basically  competitive  markets
with  the  overall  goals  of the  technologl.cal  modernization  and  enhanced
international  competitiveness  of  French  industry.  The  Socialists'
conception  was that  CPs  should  link  long-term  performance  of the
enterprises  to social  aspirations  outlined  in  the  national  plan.
i/ The  thirteen  were:  CGE,  Thomson,  Bull,  Renault,  Usinor-Sacilor,  CdF-
Chimie,  EMC,  St-Cobain,  Pechiney,  Aerospatiale,  SNECMA,  Matra,  and
S.N.P.E. The  last  two  firms  produce  armaments  and  are  under  the  control
of the  Ministry  of  Defense;  the  first  eleven  are  supervised  by the
Ministry  of Industry  and  Research.-17-
24.  The  CPs  vere  negotiated  vith  parent  corporations;  subsidiaries  and
affiliatca  were  not  dealt  with  directly. The  CPs  were  designed  to  be all-
encompassing;  i.e.,  to  replace  all  other  forms  and  procedures  of control.
They  were  also  supposed  to  be supervised  by a single  tutelle  agency,  the
appropriate  ministry  of technical  supervision.  No other  ministry  or  body
was  to  play  a  direct  role  in  the  supervisory  process. (Even  the  spokesmen
for  the  system  admit  the  difficulties  of maintaining  this  position  of each
firm  dealing  with  a single  offic,.al  interlocuteur.)  Another  difference  in
the  post-1981  process  was  that,  for  the  first  time,  workers'
representatives  were  conculted  and  involved  in the  CP negotiations.
25.  For  several  reasons,  the  impact  of this  last  group  of  CPs is
particularly  difficult  to  judge. First,  the  details  of these  CPs  were,  at
the  insistence  of the  enterprises,  kept  confidential.  There  was  a fear
that  compbtitors  would  reap  unfair  advantage  by studying  the  details  of the
agreements.  Thus,  one  cannot  compare  post-CP  performance  to the
projections  in  the  agreement. True,  the  essential  features  of the  CPs  vere
published  in  official  documents  and  press  releases,  but the  fact  remains
that  the  full  texts  are  unavailable.  Second,  eveni  if  they  were  they  would
be of limited  value  as mechanisms  to  evaluate  performance.  As noted,  this
group  of CPs  concentrated  on long-term  and  general  objectives,  aot
quantified  short-term  targets. It is  only  now,  as one  approaches  the  fifth
anniversary  of their  signing,  that  one  might  be in  a  position  to  assess  the
achievements.  But in the interim  the circumstances  have --  once more --
changed;  first,  with  the  return  to  parliamentary  power  of a center-right
government,  and  second,  in  1988,  the  re-election  of  Mr.  Mitterand  and  the
re-installation  of a Socialist  cabinet. The  result  has  been  the- 18,-
reprivatization  of several  of these  industrial  units,  the  diminution  of the
importance  of  plannîng  in  the  French  systen,  and  a general  reduction  in
importance  of the  contractualization  approach.
26.  Following  the  wave  of  nationalizations  and  the  drafting  of the  new
CPs,  the  government  took  general  stock  of the  public  enterprise  situation
in  the  utility  sector. The  conclusions  of its  review  vere disquieting.
Although  the  CP process  had  been  brought  into  being  to  combat  the  poor
financial  performance  of public  enterprises,  especially  their  persistent
tendency  to  drain  budgetary  resources,  net  transfers  from  government  to
public  enterprises  had increased  from  12.8  billion  F in  1975  to  49.5
billion  F in 1982. It  appeared  that  these  increases  took  place  despite,
not  because  of,  the  CP;  it  was argued  that  unforeseen  shifts  in  economic
and  political  circumstance  had  brought  about  the  higher  level  of funding.
But  this  excuse  only  seemed  to illustrate  the  marginal  nature  of the  CP.
The  implication  was  that  CPs  could  do little  to  predict,  much less  offset,
market  conditions.  This  raised  the  question  of  whether  the  CP  process  has
been  worth  the  massive  administrative  and  supervisory  investment  made  by
the  French. At the  core  of the  CP  process  is  the  capacity  to  project
forward  quantified  statements  concerning  production,  costs,  investments,
borrowing,  vage  bills,  capital  structure,  etc.  If  unpredictable  changes  in
polltical  and  economic  circumstances  invariably  lead  to targets,
inticators,  ratios  and  particularly  commitments  becoming  irrelevant  and
untenable,  then  what  is the  utility  of  the  exercise? What  was  the  French
goverrment  and  public  gaining  from  the  exercise?-19-
27.  It  vas  to  combat  this  problem  of  coping  with  uncertainty  that  the
second  and  third  phase  CPs  had  been  reduced  in  length  from  60 to  36 or  at
most  to  48 months. Secondly,  the  Socialist  governuent,  in  line  with  the
philosophy  shown  in  their  industrial  sector  CPs,  altered  the  objectives  of
the  process. In  essence,  the  government  increased  the  social  as  opposed  to
technical  content. The  modified  objectives  of the  CP  process  became:
(i)  assure  coordination  between  the  medium  term  objectives  of the
enterprise  and  the  policy  of the  State;
(ii)  associate  the  enterprise  in  the  "realization  of objectives  of
national  interest;:
(iii)  mobilize  the  personnel  of the  enterprise  to support  the  defined
objectives;
(iv)  allow  autonomy  of  management;  and
(v)  define  and  specify  the  financial  relations  of the  enterprise
and  the  State.
These  goals  were  more  general,  less  technical  in  nature,  than  those  put
forward  by the  ambitious  Nora  Report;  and  as such  they  were less  likely  to
be called  into  question  by shifts  in  economic  conditions. 7
28.  The  goals  had  been  redefined  in  light  of the  four  major  lessons
which  had  emerged  from  previous  experience.  These  lessons  were:
a.  Keep  contract-Rlans  short  and  simple. Initial  attempts  were
too  ambitious,  long  and  complicated;  they  attempted  to
specify  too  minutely  the  economic  future  and  the  actions  and
1/  The  lists  of objectives  (above)  and  lessons  (below)  are  found  in  J.
de Chalendar's  paper,  cited  above  in  footnote  4.-20-
reactions  of the  enterprise.  The  preferred  CP  became
shorter,  and  concentrated  on grand  aims  and  principles.
b.  Keep  CPs  flexible. Every  CP should  be treated  as a "sliding"
or rolling  plan;  every  aspect  is  subject  to renegotiation  for
change  if  the  numerous  assumptions  concerning  future
conditions  prove  inaccurate.  CPs  now  have  built-in
provisions  for  review  and  modification  on an annual  basis;
even  more  frequent  review  is  possible.
c.  "The  existence  of the  contract-plan  is  more  important  than
its  content."  That  is,  the  utility  of the  CP is  less  in its
quantified  performance  indicators  or goals  and  more  in the
formalized  periodic  exchange  of  views  between  government
owners/supervisors  and  managers. It is  the  very  process  of
being  exposed  to the  o.her  eide's  point  of  view  while
negotiating  an agreement  which  is  the  major  and  justifying
accomplishment  of the  contract-plan,  even  though  the  specific
numbers  prod-ced  in  the  exercise  are  sometimes  misleading  or
outrightly  incorrect.  This  is  a  very  important  finding;  the
activity  is  seen  as  beneficial  in  and  of itself,  not
necessarily  because  of  material  outputs.
d.  Fourthly,  in  general,  but  particularly  in  periods  of economic
crisis,  the  weaker  the  performance  of an  enterRrise.  the
greater  the  difficultv  of  negotiating  and  imnlementing  a
contract-Rlan. Negotiations  with the  SNCF  for  its  third  CP
took  close  to  two  years,  and  produced  one  of the  thicker  and-21-
more  complicated  of documents  (31  pages  of text,  44 articles,
seven  annexes). Negotiations  with the  national  steel  company
took  place  over  several  years  starting  in 1979,  but  never  led
to the  signing  of a CP.  Both  were  cases  of generally  weak
past  performance,  combined  with  particularly  high levels  of
uncertainty  with  regard  to  future  demand. It  would  seem  that
there  must  be a  modicum  level  of  both  economic  stability  and
optimism  concerning  the  future  of the  firm  before  enterprise
officials  can  envisage  committing  themselves  to a  concrete
set  of short-term  goals  and  obligations.
29.  Finally,  the  reviewers  recognized  a f-ndamental  problem  with  CPs,
a  problem  that  has  proven  even  more  intractable  iii  the  developing  countries
which  have  attempted  to  use  the  device: the  agreement  is  not  really  a
contract  for  the  simRle  reason  that  the  state  cannot  be sublected  to legal
Rroceedings.  bv the  enterDrise.  in  t-he  event  that  it  fails  to  honor  its
obligations. Repeatedly  in  France,  this  has  proven  to  be the  common  case
and  the  evident  difficulty.  The  state  could  agree  in the  abstract  to  rate
or fare  increases,  and  even  commit  itself  on  paper,  in  a document  modeled
on the  language  of a legally  binding  contract,  to  grant  firm  X a tariff
increase  of  Y percent  at time  Z.  But  all  too  often,  when  the  moment  came
to  honor  the  commitment,  the  political  costs  appeared  to  outweigh  the
financial  and  economic  benefits. Thus,  fare  increases  tended  to  be reduced
or  postponed,  several  uneconomic  factories  or lines  slated  for  closure  were
kept  open,  the  workforce  in  various  firms  was  maintained  at excessively
high  levels,  etc.  Enterprise  management  could  negotiate,  complain,  bring
to  bear  what  external  pressure  they  could  muster,  and  threaten  to  resign  to-22-
force  the  point;  but they  could  not  invoke  the  povers  of the  judicial
system. The  CP is  thus  not  really  a  contract;  it  in  an agreement  which  is
only  as good  as  the  degree  of  government  commitment  to it.
30.  French  analysts  have  tended  to  judge  the  utility  of the  CP  process
on the  basis  of  whether  the  set  targets  --  physical,  financial  and  social
--  have  been  met,  and  whether  the  actors  involved  in  the  process,  from  both
the  government  and  enterprise  side,  have  assessed  the  CP  as  being
worthwhile.  These  are  important  issues,  but they  do  not  adequately  address
two  fundamental  questions:  What  has  been  the  comnarative  performance  of
publie  enterorises  before  and  after  the  introduction  of CPs;  and  what  bas
been  the  comparative  oerfortance  of  enterprises  with  and  without  the  CP?
On  both  of these  critical  counts,  information  is,  at  best,  sketchy.
31.  Before  and  after: As indicated,  performance  of a  number  --  though
by no means  all --  of the  French  public  enterprises  submitted  to the  CPs,
at  various  points  in  the  process,  showed  financial  improvements.  It  seems
reasonable  to  think  that  some  responsibility  for  the  improvements  could  be
attributed  to  the  CP process,  for  example,  in  Air  France,  EDF  and
Charbonnages  de France. But  in  all  but  Air  France,  improvement  was  short-
lived. Either  renewed  or  unanticipated  external  shocks,  or government
failure  to take  or sustain  cost-cutting  or revenue  enhancing  measures,  or
both,  usually  intervened.  This  may indicate  that  CPs  can  only  guide  and
positively  promote  enterprise  activity  during  periods  in  which  the  initial
set  of  assumptions  holds  tiue. It  might  further  be argued  that  the  period
in  which  the  CP process  was introduced  --  1970  through  1984  --  was  an
extraordinarily  unsettled  period,  economically  and  politically,  and  that  it-23-
vas  simply  unlucky  timing  which  accounts  for  the  difficulty  in  comparing
firm  performance  before  and  after  the  introduction  of the  CP.  But  this  is
not  a  particularly  strong  argument  since  all  periods  are  unsettled  to those
living  through  them;  politicians  always  have  short-run  survival  interests
which  conflict  with  long-run  economic  gains;  this  is  simply  a constant. An
ideal  mechanism  would  deal  with this  uncertainty;  though,  admittedly,  that
is  asking  a great  deal. A reasonable  conclusion  is  that  the  CP seems  to
have  been  capable  of influencing  but  not  determining  enterprise
performance.  It  vas  of significant  but secondary  importance,  and  its
impact  was  overshadowed  by macro-economic  changes  and  shifts  in  government
policy  and  commitment.  As is the  case  vith  most  management  improvement
mechanisms  which  attempt  to  substitute  goal  specificity,  set  by
administrators  or  by negotiation,  for  market  mechanisms,  the  information
problem  quickly  becomes  overwhelming.  That is,  the  beneficial  impact  is
related  to  the  degree  of realism  of the  assumptions  and  projections
contained  in  the  CP. As external  conditions  shift,  the  assumptions  no
longer  depict  accurately  the  real  economic  world,  and  the  directing  force
of the  CP weakens.
32.  As for  with  and  without,  the  discussion  is  even  more  problematic.
For  example,  to  what  does  one  compare  EDF? The  performance  of other
European  electricity  corporations?  Or to  some  set  of synthetically  derived
performance  norms? Increasingly,  it  has  been  the  latter  measurement  which
is regarded  as  promising.  However,  it  has  been  the  CP  process  itself  which
provided  some  of the  first  attempts,  in  what  remains  a  new  field,  to
construct  performance  indicators  of this  type. Only  in  the  case  of  Air
France,  which  could  use  many  straight-foryard  market  signals  as a guide  to-24-
good  performance,  can  one  trace  out  consistently  positive  financial  results
in  `Lne  with the  goals  set  in  the  CP. (An  economic  assessment  would  be much
more  difficult.)  But  this  raises  another  question,  i.e.,  to  what  extent
can  positive  financial  results  be attributed  to  the  existence  of the  CP?
It could  be argued  that  the  prime  factor  which  led  to  Air  France's  good
performance  in  the  early  1980s  was the  decline  in  energy  prices,  and  that
this  price  decline  was  external  and  had  nothing  to  do  with the  airline's
management  or internal  procedures.  But  other  airlines  also  benefitted  from
falling  oil  prices,  and  most  failed  to translate  this  gain  into  a
demonstrably  improved  financial  position. In  brief: Air  France  did  fairly
well  when  most  European  airlines,  3perating  in  roughly  the  same  economic
environment,  did  not. During  the  period  of good  performance  Air  France  was
operating  with  a CP  when  the  other  airlines  were  not. The  CP was  thus
associated  with  comparatively  good  performance.  To  what  extent  was  ':t
responsible  for  it?
33.  Available  data  do  not  allow  one  to  say. The  issue  of assessing
rigorougly  the  economic  and  financial  impact  of  the  CP process  is  complex.
The  episodic  experience  of Air  France,  or the  other  seven  enterprises,
scattered  over  a seventeen  year  period,  in  a  variety  of activities,  and
operating  in  rapidly  shifting  policy  and  economic  environments,  does  not
add  up to  a comprehensive  or rigorous  test  of the  concept. Thus,  an
emphasis  on  whether  physical  and  financial  targets  have  been  met,  and the
subjective  assessments  of whether  or  not  participants  approve  of the
process,  is  about  all  French  observers  reasonably  could  be expected  to  do.-25-
Conclusions  on the  French  Exoerience
34.  The  conservative  government  in  power  in France  from  1986  to 1988
concentrated  its  energies  on the  privatization  of  public  enterprises.  They
started  the  process  with  manufacturing  and  financial  sector  firms,
operating  in  competitive  markets,  many  of  which  had  been  rationalized  by
the  socialists  in  1981-82. Privatization  was that  government's  economic
preoccupation  in the  public  enterprise  sector;  reform  of PEs  retained  in
State  hands  in  general  and  concerns  of the  CP  process  in  particular  slipped
to secondary  importance. 8 However,  all  of the  sixty-five  firms  --  the
thirty  privatized  and  the  thirty-five  additional  firms  which  were to  be
privatized  before  1990  --  are  in  competitive  sectors. Unlike  Great
Britain,  the  French  have  no announced  plans  to  divest  the  natural
monopolies  in  the  utility  sector. This  suggests  that  CPs,  or perhaps  yet
another  modified  version  of the  CP,  will  continue  to  be used to  guide,
orient  and  evaluate  the  performance  of  major  French  public  enterprises;  a
possibility  increased  by the  results  of the  1988  elections.
35.  The  French  have invested  a fair  amount  of  administrative  and
intellectual  resources  in the  CP  process  (though  the  marginal  difference  in
administrative  costs  may  be slight,  since  PEs  were  being  extensively
supervised  before  the  introduction  of the  concept). In  most instances,
performance  has  not  dramatically  improved  --  though  note  must  be made  of
./  A summary  of the  privatization  experience,  to the  end  of September,
1987,  was  vritten  by the  then  Minister  of Finance,  Edouard  Balladur: Je
crois  en l'homme  plus  qu'en  l'Etat (Paris: Flammarion,  1987).-26-
Air  France's  consistently  respectable  performance  under  the  CP regime.
Failure  to improve  performance  may  not  be the  "fault"  of the  CP;  but  the
process's  inability  to  protect  the  contracted  public  enterprises  from  the
vicissitudes  of uncertainty  has  proven  disappointing  to the  concept's
originators.  In several  French  instances  where  performance  has improved,
either  temporarily  or  enduringly,  it is  difficult  to  do  more than  correlate
the  presence  of the  CP  with  the  improvements;  one  cannot  say  what
percentage  of the  positive  (or  negative)  variance  is  attributable  to the
CP.  At no  point  in  the  process  have  the  French  attempted  to link
management  or  worker  incentives  with  fulfillment  of  a CP's  objectives.  In
France,  this  issue  seems  to  have  been  generally  ignored. Still,  the  actors
in  the  process,  managers  and  government  supervisors  alike,  support  CPs
because  they  enhance  the  clarity  of goals,  the  transparency  of  operations
and  achievements,  and  the  ease  of  evaluation.  These  are  advances. But,
partly  because  the  costs  of  creating  the  CP  have  not  been  calculated,  one
cannot  tell  if  benefits  justify  the  investment.
Il. The Experience  of Developing  Countries
36.  As noted,  the  first  recorded  attempt  to  export  the  CP process  was
in  1973,  in  a single  Tunisian  textile  public  enterprise.  It never
proceeded  to the  implementation  stage. The  first  concerted  effort  to
replicate  the  CP process  in  a  developing  country  took  place  in 1980-82,  in
Senegal.-27-
A.Senegal
37.  The  Senegalese  case  illustrates  the  thesis  that  there  are
similarities  in  the  problema  faced  by public  enterprises  in industrialized
countries  and  in developing  countries.  The  distinctions  are  mainly  a
matter  of  degree  rather  than  of kind. Ambiguous  or  contradictory  goals,
politically  determined  deviations  from  profit-making  or profit-
maximization,  efficiency-reducing  bureaucratie  control  and  supervision
systems,  financ'ng  and  investment  decisions  based  on inadequate  or
inappropriate  analysis  --  these  and  other  deficiencies  are  seen  in  Europe
as  well  as  Africa,  in  North  America  as  well  as Asia. However,  some  aspects
of these  problems  in  developing  countries  are  particularly  intense. For
example,  rarely  if  ever  would  one  find  a European  public  enterprise  failing
completely  to  produce  accounts,  or  being  incapable  of submitting  accounts
to  auditors  for  several  years  running,  or  having  no internal  financial
control  systems,  or not  receiving  payments,  for  its  goods  or services,  from
the  government  itself,  to the  tune  of  millions  of dollars  of arrears. Yet
these  difficulties  are  common  in  LDC  public  enterprises.  It  vas to  attack
grave  deficiencies  of this  nature,  and  to  begin  the  process  of resolving
the  large  scale,  systemic,  economie  and  financial  problems  these
deficiencies  led  to,  that  the  World  Bank  and  the  Government  of Senegal,  in
1976,  launched  the  preparations  which  vould  lead  to  the  signing  of a
Technical  Assistance  Project  to  the  Parapublie  Sector. It  vas  the  first  of
its  kind in  Africa,  and  in  the  Bank. 9 k
91  The  details  of the  project,  and  an assessment  of its  accomplishments
and  shortcomings,  can  be found  in  the  "Project  Completion  Report  - Senegal
- First  Technical  Assistance  Project  to the  Parapublic  Sector,"  World
Bank,  January,  1985.-28-
38.  A 1977  Bank  review  of the  Senegalese  PE sector  had  stated:
Supervision  needs.  to  be carried  out  on a  contractual  basis
for  enterprises  to  be able  to  manage  themselves.  Management
by objectives  could  thus  meaningfully  be introduced  under
which  each  enterprise  would  negotiate  with  Government
annually  the  targets  to  be set  for  it  and  vould  then  be
judged  accorded  to the  results  it  achieved-
This  idea  vas  not  pursued  in  the  early  stages  of the  ensuing  project,  which
entered  into  effectiveness  in  1978. It  was  not  until  1980,  and  partly  in
response  to the  project-assisted  improvement  in  the  flow  and  accuracy  of
information  on the  poor  performance  of  public  enterprises,  that  the
government  decided  to:
- adopt CPs,
- create  a CP "Cell"  in the  Prime  Minister's  Office,  and
- ask  the  Bank  for  assistance  with  this  aspect  of PE reform.
The  objectives  vere the  same  as those  which  had  inspired  the  French  CP
process: to  clarify  goals;  to  coordinate  the  various  government
supervisory  bodies,  which  either  offered  conflicting  directives  or operated
according  to  different  schedules;  and  to commit  both the  government  and  the
enterprise  to  a clear  course  of  action  which  would  result  in  higher
productivity  and  lower  costs.
39.  Between  March  of 1981  and  May  of 1988,  contract-plans  vere  signed
in  nine  different  public  enterprises.  Since  three  of the  nine  are  now  in
their  second  CP,  a total  of  twelve  sets  of  negotiations  have  been
concluded.  The  first  three  Senegalese  CPs (rural  development  agencies
receive  a  more  preliminary  agreement,  called  a "lettre  de  mission,"  roughly-29-
translatable  as "statement  of objectives")  vere  prepared  between  March  of
1981  and  January  of 1982,  in  SOTRAC,  SAED  and  SODEFITEX.  Respectively,
these  firms  operated  in  the  fields  of transport,  agriculture  and
rural/regional  development.  In 1984,  the  government  decided  to  renew  the
process  in SOTRAC,  SAED  and  SODEFITEX,  and  to  apply  CPs  to  other  major
enterprises.  CPs  or "lettres  de  mission"  vere  subsequently  instelled  in
SONATEL  (telecommunications),  SONEES  (water),  SENELEC  (electricity),
SOMIVAC,  SODEVA  and  SODAGRI  (agriculture/rural  development).  CPs  are
presently  being  negotiated  in  OHLM  (housing),  OCPE (post  and  savings),  RCFS
(railway),  and  PAD (the  port  of Dakar). Thus,  in terms  of  number  and  range
of types  of PEs  affected,  Senegal  now  has the  largest  CP  program  in  the
world.
40.  Thf  1977  diagnosis  of the  sector  had  revealed  fundamental  problems
in  a  number  of important  PEs. In some  cases  --  SOTRAC  and  SAED  for  example
--  it  was  thought  that  the  installation  of  a CP  would  be the  main
improvement  and  restructuring  method  in  and  of itself. In other  cases,
most  notably  that  of the  telecommunications/post  office,  the  OPT,  it  was
decided  that  problems  vere  s0  severe  that  reorganization  should  precede  the
application  of the  CP.  In the  case  of the  OPT,  the  result  was  a splitting
of the  firm  into  two  enterprises,  both  of  which  (SONATEL  and  OPCE)  were
then  subjeci.ed  to  the  CP  process.  This  raised  a question  which  is  not  yet
resolved: should  CPs  be  used  on the  most  severely  troubled  enterprises,  or
should  their  use  be reserved  for  non-  or  mildly-troubled  companies?
Developing  countries  tend  to  use  CPs  as rescue  devices  for  poorly
performing  firms,  with  questionable  results. The  Air France  experience-30-
indicates  that  their  utility  as improvement  devices  in  basically  sound,
quasi-competitive  firms  has  been  insufficiently  examined.
41.  The  first  set  of Senegalese  CPs  followed  closely  the  French
conception  and  practice. In line  with the  lessons  learned  in  France  in the
70s,  they  were  fixed  for  three  year  periods. Good  examples  of the  first
group  of  CPs,  illustrating  the  range  of  bodies  to  which  the  process  was
applied,  and  of subsequent  implementation  and  modification  problems,  vere
the  cases  of  SOTRAC,  the  Dakar  region  bus  company,  and  SAED,  the  Senega].
River  and  Delta  Development  Authority. (It  must  be noted  that  of the  first
three,  only  the  SOTRAC  CP  was  carried  through  to  conclusion,  while  the  SAED
agreement  came  close;  the  third,  and  others  whieh  had  been  considered  but
never  negotiated,  were  all  dependent,  for  the  funding  of their  investment
programs,  on  resources  to  be made  available  through  the  first  Structural
Adjustment  Credit,  negotiated  with  the  World  Bank  in  1981.  Due  to  a
dispute  over  agricultural  prices,  only  the  first  tranche  of this  credit  Was
.eleased.  Given  the  unavailability  of funds,  two  of the  first  five  CPs
were  never  negotiated,  much  less  implemented.)
The  First  Phase
42.  The first  Senegalese  SOTRAC  CP  was  a short  document  of eight
articles,  stating  the  purpose  of the  enterprise,  the  assets  to  be deployed
during  the  period  of the  CP,  projected  performance,  obligations  of the
government,  and  means  of implementing  and  modifying  the  CP.  SOTRAC's
future  position,  the  agreement  stated,  could  only  be secured  by dealing
with  three  critical  issues: renewed  investment  in  vehicles,  a  paying  off-31-
of the  substantial  arrears  (1.1  billion  francs  CFA)  in  goveriument
subsidies,  and  government  permission  to  increase  prices. The  agreement
specified  the  three  year investment  program  of  SOTRAC,  and  projected  a
stabilization  of losses,  as  opposed  to  substantially  increased  losses  which
might  normally  be expected  during  a  period  of  massive  reinvestment.
Improvements  were  projected  in the  cash  flow  posicion.
43.  The  government's  obligations  were  clearly  spelled  out. Gover.nent
zgreed  to  a  precise  timetable  to  pay  off  the  arrears  on previously  promised
subsidies,  and  to  pay future  subsidies  according  to  a set  schedule. SOTRAC
was  declared  exempt  from  normal  duties  and  taxes  on the  materials  it
imported. The  national  government  promised  to "do  its  utmost"  to  persuade
the  communal  government  of  Dakar  to  bear  some  of SOTRAC's  subsidy,  maintain
the  regional  road  network,  and  assist  in  the  construction  and  maintenance
of SOTRAC's  terminals.
44.  A technical  innovation  of the  SOTRAC  CP  was the  use  of three
different  pricing  hypotheses.  That  is,  during  negotiations  the  government
committed  itself  to  alloving  SOTRAC  a  price  increase  during  the  CF  period,
but  government  representatives  vere  unable  to  specify  the  amount  by which
prices  would  be authorized  to rise. The  CP  posited  three  different
scenarios,  which  traced  out  differing  financial  results  according  to the
amount  of tariff  increase  allowed.
45.  The  CP covered  the  main issues  of enterprise  purpose,  prices,
investment  capital,  financial  results  and  CP  monitoring.  It  did  not  cover
performance  indicators  other  than  net  financial  results. This  was  an-32-
inadequacy;  commercial  profitability  is  an imperfect  indicator  of the
performance  of a  monopoly,  heavily  subsidized  public  enterprise,  especially
one  receiving  the  indirect  subsidies  mentioned  in  para.  43.  (This
shortcoming  vas  corrected  in the  second  SOTRAC  CP.)
46.  In  contrast  to  SOTRAC,  the  CP --  termed  a 'lettre  de  mission"  --
with  SAED (the  Senegal  River  and  Delta  Development  .:athority)  was  a long
document,  produced  after  complicated  negotiations.  Covering  the  period
1981-84,  the  agreement  was  more  a restructuring  device  than  a  contract;  its
purpose  was  to  resolve  fundamental  operational  difficulties  of  an extremely
expensive  and  inefficient  rural  development  agency. This  was the  first
time,  anywhere,  that  the  contract  process  had  been  applied  to an  enterprise
of this  type (though  it is  not  clear  whether  the  targets  were  negotiated,
as they  would  and  should  be in  a CP,  or  whether  the  goals  were  simply
imposed  by government  directives).  The  document  laid  out  a  variety  of
quantified  production  goals  for  SAED: number  of  undeveloped  hectares  to  be
turned  into  farmland,  number  of  existing  farms  to  be expanded,  and
production  and  marketing  targets  for  paddy,  tomatoes  and  maize. The
agreement  dwelt  on the  reorganization  of SAED,  emphasizing  the  need  for
management  information  and  budgetary  control  systems,  rational  personnel
management  and  improved  accounting  and  expenditure  control,  the  details  of
which  were  spelled  out. Government  obligations  vere stated  more  vaguely:
for  example,  the  CP  noted  that  the  State  "would  be required  to  provide
(SAED)  with  adequate  working  capital;" ther-.  was  an admission  that  only
half  of the  minimally  essential  investment  funds  were  available,  and  that
"Government  now  has to  find  the  remaining  50  percent,  i.e.,  CFAF  5.435
billion;"  and  on the  crucial  matter  of farmgate  pricing,  the  agreement  was-33-
less  than  legally  precise: "Government  will  maintain  producer  prices  at
levels  sufficiently  remunerative  not  to interfere  with  debt  servicing  and
sufficiently  attractive  to stimulate  production.'
47.  The  CP set  out  the  schedule  for  government's  quarterly  subsidy  to
the  enterprise,  necessitated  by "the  difference  between  the  billing  rate
set  by the  Government  and  the  actual  cost  of  production  and  services
rendered;"  and  to  cover  those  operations  imposed  on SAED  "for  which  there
is  no  billing  provision."  A second  table  presented  the  estimated  payment
dates  for  the  clearing  up of  previously  promised  subsidies,  now
substantially  in  arrears. The  document  concluded  with  a statement  that  it
was  "binding  on the  two  parties." It  was  signed  by the  Director  Gerneral  of
SAED,  the  Chairman  of SAED's  Board,  and  --  for  the  government  --  the  Prime
Minister,  the  Minister  of Finance  and  the  Minister  of Rural  Development.
The  letter  of understanding  had  been  conceived,  prepared,  negotiated  and
signed  in  a  period  of seven  months. (This  appeared  long  at the  time;
subsequently,  preparations  for  most  CPs  have  taken  much longer.)  The
overall  result  was  a document  of some  thirty  pages,  not including  annexes,
but  with  most  of the  specificity  on the  side  of the  enterprise's  goals;  the
government's  obligations  remained  vague.
Fundamental  Problems
48.  The initial  experience  with  CPs  was  judged  as  only  moderately
positive. Management  autonomy  did  not  increase  to the  anticipated  degree.
The  lack  of  physical  performance  indicators  in  the  SOTRAC  CP proved  to  be a
problem,  as did  the  shortfall  in  specificity  of  government  obligations  and-34-
undertaklngs  in  the  SAED  agreement.  Hovever,  from  the  outset  and
continuing  to  the  present,  the  two  more important  problems  with  the  CP
concept  in Senegal  vere:  (a)  the  government's  inability  to  keep  its
financial  promises,  and (b)  the  enterprises'  --  and  the  supervising
agencies'  --  inability  to force,  pressure  or cajole  the  government  into
honoring  those  commitments.  In SOTRAC  and  SAED,  and  later  on in  almost
every  enterprise  submitted  to  the  CP  process,  the  government  committed
itself  in the  CP and  then  either  failed  to  settle  its  arrears  to the  firm,
or failed  to  honor  an  agreement  to  pay  off  subsidy  sums  promised  in the
past,  or failed  to  meet  timetables  on  current  subsidy  payments,  or failed
to  inject  promised  amounts  of equity,  or failed  to  give  final  approval  to
previously  agreed  upon investments,  or failed  to  allow  price  or rate
increases  which  vould  have increased  the  self-financing  capacity  of the
enterprises.  In  most  cases,  a combination  of these  defaults  vas  present.
49.  Neither  Government's  lack  of resources  nor its  lack  of financial
discipline  vas  caused  by the  CPs;  rather,  the  CPs  rendered  transparent  and
quantified  government's  shortcomings  --  and  it  can  be argued  that  these
were  necessary  and  progressive  steps. Drawing  attention  to a  problem  is  a
step  in  overcoming  it,  but  despite  repeated  flagging  of the  issue  it
remains  unresolved  to  the  present. The  Government  recognizes  the  problem;
in its  1988  review  of the  "State  of  Application  of the  Reform  of the
Parapublic  Sector,"  the  chief  PE  supervising  agency  in  the  Office  of the
President  stated: "Non-respect  of the  State's  financial  commitments
remains  the  central  problem  with  lettres  de  mission  and  certain  contract-
plans...  The  result  is  that  the  credibility  of the  CPs  is  veakened..."-35-
50.  The  general  lines  of the  problem  would  have  been familiar  to  the
French;  but in the  Senegalese  case  the  difficulty  vas  of  a greater
magnitude  and  intensity,  in  terms  of  the  number  of  CP'ed  enterprises  in
such  difficulties,  and  the  size  of the  gap  between  what  government  had  said
it  would  do,  and  what it  actually  did. Several  factors  contribute  to this
problem. First,  the  entire  Senegalese  planning  tradition  and  experience
has  consistently  tended  to  produce  extensive  and  ambitious  lists  of
desirable  activities,  vithout  sufficient  specificity  on  where  the  money
vill  come  to  pay  for  them. 10 CPs  have  proven  to  be  but  another  example  of
this  well-entrenched  process. A second  factor  contributing  to the
financial  unreality  of the  CPs  has  been  that  they  were  all  produced,  in
first  draft  form  at least,  by consultants  who  naturally  attempted  to
produce  agreements  which  vould  improve  the  position  of their  main  client,
the  firm  to  be CP'ed. Moreover,  and  again  naturally,  they  were  produced  in
isolation  one  from  the  other;  no  drafter  of  one  CP  knew  the  budgetary
implications  of any  other  CP.  Thus,  the  draft  CPs  tended  to  specify
financial  conditions  which  would  allow  the  firm  to  carry  out  what
management  and  the  drafting  consultants  saw  as the  enterprise's  mandate.
The  viewpoint  was  that  of adding  all  resources  necessary  to  rebuild  the
enterprise;  the  notion  of  what  the  State  could  afford  was secondary,  if
taken  into  consideration  at all.
1Q/  See  Pierre  Guislain,  "Les  Contrats-Plan  dan  les  pays  en
developpement:  Un moyen  d'organiser  les  relations  entre  le gouvernement
et les  entreprises  publiques  en  vue  d'ameliorer  les  performances  desdites
entreprises,'  World  Bank,  LEGWA,  May,  1987.-36-
51.  The  first  level  of review  for  the  draft  CPs  is,  theoretically,  in
the  technical  ministries.  Officials  and  managers  interviewed  state  that
technical  tutelle  ministries  almost  always  approve,  without  question  or
deletion,  whatever  proposals  are  put forward  by the
consultants/enterprises.  No global  consideration  of  what  Government  can
afford  takes  place  at this  level. Indeed,  one  could  argue  that  it is
unrealistic  to  expect  the  technical  ministries  to restrain  the  growth  or
operations  of "their"  enterprises;  that  they  are  quite  content  to see  their
PEs  expand. This  means  that  responsibility  for  global  consideration  of the
aggregate  financial  impact  of the  CPs  rests  with  the  central  agencies,  the
Delegation  for  the  Reform  of the  Parapublic  Sector  in  the  Office  of the
President,  and  the  Parapublic  Sector  Cell  in  the  Ministry  of Finance.
52.  These  bodies  have  not  done  their  job. These  central  reviewers
have  tended  to:
- accept  uncritically  the  draft  CPs. At first,  they  often  failed  to
appreciate  the  financial  implications  of the  agreements,  individually  much
less  than  in  the  aggregate.  The  resource  implications  surfaced  later,  and
either  delayed  the  signature  or implementation  of the  CP,  or  only  became
apparent  after  signature,  leading  to  problems  discussed  below.
- More  recently,  Ministry  of Finance  reviewers  of CPs  have
recognized  that  financial  commitments  called  for  in some  CPs  vere
unrealistic  or excessive.  They  have  made  note  of their  concern,  and  called
the  attention  of  higher  officials  to  their  view. However,  they  have  been
told  that  they  must  approve  and  sign  the  CPs,  even  though  they know  the
promised  resources  will  not  be available.  The  justification  has  been that
the  political  situation  requires  the  signature  of the  obviously  unrealistic-37-
document,  and  that  the  resources  might  surface  (from  some  unspecified
source)  during  the  course  of the  CP.
53.  In short,  central  officials  have  regularly  approved  expenditure
forecasts  which,  when  sumed, far  exceeded  government's  resources.  They
then  applied  what  one  might  call  traditional  budgeting  techniques,  which
can  be summarized  as:  use  whatever  resources  are  on  hand to  deal  with the
most acute  crisis,  as  determined  by the  pol.itical  process  or  leadership;
ignore  previously  determined  budgets,  agreements,  commitments,  contract-
plans,  etc.,  and  give  the  squeakiest  wheels  the  smallest  amount  of  oil
which  will  quiet  them  for  the  moment. The  CPs  were  supposed  to  solve  this
problem  but  they  did  not,  due  to the  simple  fact  that  the  CPs,  taken
together,  committed  the  government  to  spend  far  more  money  than  it  had
available.
Evaluation  and  Revisions  in the  Process
54.  Despite  the  overall  financial  problems,  can  one  perceive
differences  in  micro-performance  between  enterprises  with  CPs  and  those
without? Only  one  study  has  been  undertaken  which  attempted  to  compare
results. Performance  of the  first  six  PEs  with  CPs  was  contrasted  to the
performance  of a  group  of eighteen  non-CP'ed  public  enterprises.  The
analysis  reviewed  the  period  1980-83.  Both  groups  ran  losses  in these
three  years;  and  both  groups  reduced  their  rate  of loss  by about  the  same
percentage  at the  end  of the  period. Perceptible  differences  occurred  in
only  two  areas: the  contracted  PEs  had  a growth  in  turnover  of 93  percent
in the  period,  as  opposed  to  66  percent  in  the  non-contracted  firms;  and-38-
personnel  costs  rose  13  percent  in  the  contracted  firms,  versus  45  percent
increases  in the  non-contracted  enterprises.  Levels  of debt  reduction  vere
about  the  same  in  both  groups. For  several  reasons,  these  moderately
positive  results  have to  be interpreted  cautiously.  First,  the  indicators
showing  variance  a:e  of secontdary  importance.  The  major  performance
indicators  of  profitability,  self-financing  ratios  and  return  on  capital
invested  were  the  same (and  poor)  for  both  sets  of firms. Second,  the
differences  seen  are  of questionable  size  and  significance.  Third,  the
period  reviewed  was  quite  brief. Fourth,  the  enterprises  compared  differed
greatly  in  structure,  purpose,  market  position,  etc. It is  difficult  to
argue  that  like  vas  being  compared  to  like. Nonetheless,  despite  the
drawbacks  of  and  qualifications  to this  study,  it  deserves  praise  as the
only  attempt  to  &ssess  quantitatively  the  impact  of the  CP.  More  and
better  studies  of this  nature  are  required. It  would  be very  useful  to
mount  a  detailed  comparison  of  performance  of  firms  with  CPs  as opposed  to
those  vithout,  as  well  as a comparison  of performance  of  enterprises  before
and  after  the  introduction  of  CPs.
55.  Regardless  of the  lack  of  major  improvements  in  performance,  and
as  was  the  case  in  France,  Senegalese  managers  and  government  supervisors
working  with  CPs  have  almost  universally  concluded  that  they  are  beneficial
devices,  the  use  of  which  should  be continued.  Interviews  with  eighteen
Senegalese  officials  and  managers,  concluded  in  January  of 1986,  indicated
strong  support  for  the  CP  process. Managers  approved  of the  heightened
clarity  of goals,  the  specification  of government's  financial
responsibilities,  and  the  concept  of government  compensation  for  non-
commercial  activities  imposed  on the  enterprise.  Officials  saw  the  major-39-
advantage  as the  increase  in the  autonomy  and  responsibility  of management.
(One  could  argue  that  both  groups  liked  those  features  which  h  "-ighted
the  responsibilities  of the  other  party.) Indeed,  all  involved  .arties,
including  project  officers  from  the  World  Baik,  have found  the  CP
irresistibly  appealing. In  theory,  it  clarifies  objectives,  determines
priorities,  allocates  resources,  guides  and  stimulates  productive  behavior
and  eases  evaluation.
56.  The  CP appears  to  be the  perfectly  logical  response  to an
intractable  set  of  problems  and  needs. Though  its  application  has failed,
at least  in the  short  run,  to  produce  dramatically  improved  performance,  it
is  nonetheless  regarded  as  a  worthwhile  innovation  because  of the
constructive  dialogue  it  creates  between  managers  and  owners. The  problem
is  that  CPs  do not  force  financial  discipline  on the  government.  In
response,  the  tendency  has  been  to shift  the  criteria  by  which  its  utility
is  judged  (as  in  France),  or to  hope  that  modifications  vill increase  its
impact  (the  Senegalese  approach).
The  Second  Wave
57.  The  workings  of the  second  group  of CPs  (see  para.  39)  showed  a
continuation  of the  problems. (In  the  case  of SENELEC,  the  CP  vas  not
signed  until  1987.) The  SONEES  example,  while  perhaps  something  of an
extreme  case,  reveals  the  workings  of  the  process. The  main  features  of
the  agreement  vere increases  in  the  tariff  structure,  and  a
rehabilitation/investment  program,  to  be funded  through  settlement  of the
governsment's  outstanding  debts  to  the  company. The  functioning  of the  CP-40-
was  subjected  to  a review  at the  end  of 1985. Major  difficulties  were
apparent. In the  review  period,  despite  the  enactment  of the  price
increase,  revenues  of SONEES  were  16  percent  lower  than  anticipated;  costs
5  percent  higher. But the  critical  problem  was  the  usual  one:  "neither
the  State  nor the  local  governments  have  respected  their  commitments"  to
settle  outstanding  accounts. The  result  was  a  deficit  five  times  greater
than  anticipated,  and  a reduction  by half  in  the  essential
rehabilitation/investment  program.
58.  As of  June,  1985,  the  total  public  agency  debt  to SONEES  was 5.5
billion  F CFA. The  company's  financial  situation  was  desperate.  Operating
costs  were  being  financed  by short-term  bank  overdrafts,  at  high interest
rates. Suppliers  vere  demanding  higher  and  higher  advance  payments,  or
adding  substantial  "waiting  premiums"  to their  bids,  or  --  most  commonly
--  simply  refusing  to  do  business  vith  the  company. SONEES  stopped  paying
its  bills,  with the  result  that  it  was  threatened  with  stoppage  of
electricity  services,  among  others. "These  financial  difficulties  have  led
us to  juggle  our  creditors,  and  put  them  off  as long  as  possible." The
company  cancelled  all  training  programs,  ignored  scheduled  maintenance
procedures,  and  froze  emplcyment  in  an attempt  to  cut  costs. The  negative
long term implications  of these  measures --  save perhaps the last --  is
evident.
59.  In accord  with the  provisions  of the  CP,  SONEES  approached  the
Ministry  of Finance. Despite  repeated  resubmissions  of their  case,  they
received  no reply  of any  sort  during  the  whole  of 1985. The  simple  fact
was that  "...despite  the  provisions  of the  contract-plan,  no deposit  has-41-
been  made to  our  account  since  1  January  1985." The  suggested  solutions
were  obvious: government  and  the  other  public  agencies  must  pay  at once
their  bills;  and  steps  must  be taken  to see  that  the  arrears  do not  simply
start  again. SONEES  officials  suggested  that  at the  start  of each  fiscal
year  the  government  should  deposit  in  SONEES'  account  65  percent  of the
previous  year's  budgeted  payments. At the  very least,  pleaded  the
enterprise,  government  should  pay its  outstanding  debts.
A Detailed  Example: The  SONATEL  CP
60.  Despite  the  difficulties  with  enforcing  the  provieions  of the
SONEES'  and  other  CPs,  "contractualization"  was  made  a  key  feature  of the
government's  "New  Policy  Towards  the  Parapublic  Sector,"  announced  in  mid-
1985. CPs  were  cited  as  one  of the  principal  means  by which  enterprise
performance  would  be improved. The  policy  stated  that  each  year five
enterprises  would  be submitted  to  the  process. (The  schedule  has  not  been
met.) Money-losing  enterprises  with  a  heavy  social  service  obligation  were
to  be given  first  priority. The  policy  implied  that  enterprises  without  a
clear  social  service  mission  would  be prime  candidates  for  divestiture.
61.  A positive  example  of the  more  recent  crop  of Senegalese  CPs,
showing  how they  have  been  modified  in  an  attempt  to deal  with  the
prevailing  high  level  of  budgetary  and  economic  uncertainty,  can  be found
in  the  contract  negotiated  vith  SONATEL. The  CP was  signed  in 1986,  after
close  to  two  years  of  negotiations.  (This  enterprise  is  the
telecommunications  parastatal  which  was  created  after  the  break-up  of the-42-
OPT.)  The  standard  features  of a  CP  were  retained: statement  of
enterprise  objectives,  commitments  of the  government,  and  mechanisms  of
monitoring  the  agreement.  To these  were  added  several  other  features:  a
detailed  set  of physical,  financial  and  quality  of service  performance
indicators,  several  means  tonpressure  government  ln  case  of failure  to
honor  obligations,  and  a section  on  how the  plan  could  be modified,
quickly,  ln  case  its  financial  and  operational  assumptions  proved
inaccurate.  A review  of the  sections  of this  carefully  prepared  CP is
revealing.
62.  The  preamble  noted  the  high  level  of  unsatisfied  demand  for
telephone  services  in  Senegal. It  recalled  government's  decis'on  to  create
a  new,  commercially-run  and  above  all  autonomous  body to  deal  exclusively
with  this  service  (in  line  with  the  "New  Policy..."  the  slogan  of  which
was "manage  less  but  manage  better"). Section  1 (of  seven)  summarized  the
laws  and  decrees  creating  and  regulating  the  company,  emphasizing  that  the
supervising  ministries,  technical  and  financial,  "...carry  out  normally
their  roles,  which  consists  of overseeing  the  strict  application  of the
texts  regulating  the  public  service,  but that  they  do  not interfere,  in
either  their  advice  or theié  actions,  in the  daily  management  of the
enterprise."  Section  2  offered  the  objectives  of the  CP  exercise: to
determine  SONATEL's  performance  criteria;  to  determine  the  strategy  and  the
actions  the  enterprise  would  take  to  attain  its  aims;  and  to define  the
obligations  of the  State  to the  firm. The  third  Section  set  out  the  firm's
objectives  in the  contract  period:-43-
to improve  the  quality  of service;
to  complete  on schedule  several  major  investment  and  supply
projects;
to  better  utilize  the  firm's  humen  resources;
to  determine  a schedule  for  giving  to  every  citizen  "easy
access  to  a telephone;"  and
to improve  the  image  of the  national  telephone  service.
Performance  Indicators
63.  Section  four  dealt  with  performance  criteria. The  enterprise
committed  itself  in  the  contract  period  to  hold  constant  the  number  of
employees,  and  to limit  the  annual  rate  of growth  of its  vage  bill  to 10
percent. The  main  measures  of  physical  production  were "number  of requests
filled  for  new  principal  telephone  and  telex  lines;"  and  growth  of the
total  number  of telephones  in  use.  Specific,  quantified  targets  vere  fixed
for  each  activity  for  each  of the  three  years  of the  CP.  The  enterprise
contracted  to improve  service  quality,  as  measured  by reducing  the  length
of repair  time,  reducing  the  delay  in  obtaining  a dia'.  tone,  and  reducing
the  number  of  misdirected  and  incorrect  calls  dup  to faulty  equipment  or
switching.  Again,  precise  numerical  mc.asures  of each  of these  indicators
vas stated  in  the  CP (for  example,  repair  of a telephone  within  eight  days
of request  would  rise  from  66  percent  of cases  in 1985  to 80  percent  at the
end  of the  <P  period).
64.  SONATEL  contracted  to improve  the  productivity  of its  personnel.
The  measurement  was  that  personnel  costs,  as a  percentage  of  operating-44-
revenues,  would  fall  from  5 to  4.4  percent. With regard  to  the  important
issue  of customer  rates,  the  CP noted  that  a  study  on SONATEL'S  tariffs  was
scheduled  to  be completed  in  January  of 1988. In the  interim,  rates  would
be frozen  at their  1985  levels,  as long  as the  company  maintained  a  minimum
self-financing  level  of 40  percent. If  the  ratio  fell  below  that  figure,
SONATEL  could  request  an emergency  rate  hike.
65.  Financial  forecasts  and  performance  indicators  were  equally
detailed. Revenues,  cash-flow,  profits  and  operating  co-efficients  were
projected  for  each  year  of the  CP period. The  same  was  done  for  investmer.t
matters;  the  contract  estimated  annual  investment  costs,  and  the  amounts  to
be generated  internally  and  raised  externally  to cover  the  investments.
Total  investments  of 34.4  billion  F  CFA  were  forecast. SONATEL  agreed  to
devote  a small,  precisely  defined  portion  of its  investments  to creating
telephone  service  in rural  and  remote  localities;  this  was  an "investment
of a social  character."
66.  Considerable  attention  was  paid  to the  issue  of  cost  recovery.
First,  the  compeny  agreed  to  speed  the  issuance  of  bills  to  customers;  the
delay  between  meter  reading  and  bill issuance  was  projected  to fall  from  51
days (1985)  to 20  days  in  1989. Second,  SONATEL undertook  to improve  the
position  of its  accounts  receivable.  The  CP  noted  that  as of 30.6.86
SONATEL  was  owed  12.3  billion  F  CFA  in  overdue  subscriber  accounts  alone
(of  which  6  billion  was  owed  by government  and  other  parastatal  agencies).
The  CP  projected  a complete  cleaning  up  of the  public  overdue  accounts  by
1988,  but  only  a  modest  diminution  of outstanding  private  arrears. An
annex  laid  out  a precise  schedule  for  the  payment  of  public  arrears.-45-
Prominent'y  displayed  in  the  CP vas  the  sentence: "It  in  assumed  that  the
State  will  respect  the  payment  timetable  detailed  in  Annex  7."  The  same
annex  dealc  vith  the  repayment  to  the  State,  by SONATEL,  of  an outstanding
loan  of  4.4  billion  F  CFA, implying  a  net  transfer  of  about  1  billion  --  a
large  but  not  overwhelming  sum.
67.  Section  five  listed  the  commitments  of the  State  towards  SONATEL.
The  government  agreed  "not  to impose  on SONATEL  investment  charges  for
expanding  service  to  remote  localities"  over  and  above  those  previously
agreed  to.  It  gave  a commitment  to  pay,  according  to a  set  schedule,
overdue  accounts. Of course,  most  earlier  CPs  had  had such  provisions  and,
as  noted,  the  government  had  failed  to  honor  them. To  counter  this
problem,  article  23  of the  SONATEL  CP introduced  a  new idea. It  read:
In order  Co  avoid  the  recurrence  of  unpaid  bills,  the  State
commits  itself  to  clearly  set  out  in its  budget,  as  vell  as
in  the  budgets  of the  local  governments  and  public
enterprises  it  supervises,  the  sums  necessary  to settle  the
accounts  and  credits  of  SONATEL...
68.  T'is  linking  of the  CP directly  to  the  budget  process,  not  simply
of the  national  government  but  of the  local  governments  and  public
enterprises  as  vell,  had  not  previously  been  seen  (though  it  had  been
called  for  in  the  SONEES  review.) It  is  a simple  and  clever  idea  to  which
one  cannot  rationally  object. No organization  can  put  forvard  a reasonable
excuse  to  ignore  basic  operating  costs,  of  which  telephone  service  is
surely  one. This  commitment  attacks  the  root  financial  problem  of  public
enterprises  in  Africa,  which  is  that  governments  have  paid  for  their-46-
services  or met  their  financing  obligations  only  when it  is convenient  for
the  public  treasury,  as  opposed  to  when it  is  desirable  or  necessary,  from
the  point  of  view  of the  firm.
69.  The  State  agreed  to  abide  by the  recommendations  of the  tariff
study. This  was tantamount  to  agreeing  to  substantial  increases,  since  a
recommendation  for  increases  was  highly  likely  to  be  produced. It also
contracted  to  treat  seriously  and  sympathetically  any  price  increase
requested  by SONATEL  under  the  emergency  provisions  mentioned  above. With
regard  to the  enterprise's  ambitious  investment  program,  the  government
agreed  "to  take  all  measures  to  facilitate  SONATEL's  access  to  necessary
external  financing,"  within  the  limits  of the  public  sector  debt  ceiling
agreed  with the  IMF.
70.  Section  six  was  entitled  "Monitoring  of the  Execution  of  the
Contract-Plan."  In  what is  now  a standard  Senegalese  practice,  and  in
sharp  distinction  to  French  procedure  (where  government  monitoring  of the
CP is  handled  by the  technical  supervisory  ministry),  the  CP created  a
Monitoring  Committee  for  the  supervision  and  change  of SONATEL'S  CP.  This
committee  was  composed  of,  on the  one  hand,  the  Director  General  of SONATEL
and  "his  principal  collaborators;"  and  for  government,  an eight  person  team
consisting  of the  following  officials  "or  their  representatives:"
- the  Director  of the  CP supervisory  unit,  Office  of the
President;
- SONATEL's  Financial  Controller  (the  representative  in  SONATEL
of the  Ministry  of  Finance,  who is  permanently  attached  to
the  PE);-47-
the  Director  of the  Bureau  of Organization  and  Methods,
Office  of the  President;
the  Director  of the  Budget  Department,  Ministry  of Finance;
the  Director  of the  Debt  and  Investments  Department,  Ministry
of Finance;
the  Director  of  Planning,  Ministry  of  Plan;
the  Director  of  Finance  Programming  and  Investment
Monitoring,  Ministry  of  Plan,  and
the  Director  of the  Cabinet  of the  Ministry  of Communications
(all  of the  above  are  more  or less  permanent  members  of the
committee;  this  official  only  attends  the  meetings  dealing
with  the  firms  reporting  to  his  ministry;  he is replaced  by
bis  equivalent  from  other  ministries  when  their  PEs  are
concerned).
71.  The  CP states  that  this  committee  will  meet  at least  twice  a  year;
once  in  January  to  examine  the  firm's  performance  over  the  past  year,  and
to  review  an annual  report  submitted  by SONATEL's  management;  and  in  June
to  review  progress  and  problems  of the  firm,  vis-a-vis  the  provisions  of
the  CP.  The  agreement  states  that  if  the  firm  is  not  attaining  its
objectives  as contracted,  or if  the  government  is  not  honoring  its
commitments,  the  committee  will  examine  the  reasons  for  the  problema  and
"will  propose  appropriate  measures  to  remedy  them,"  including,  if
necessary,  thorough  revision. Further:
If  economic,  social  or financial  conditions  change  to such
an  extent  as  to  call  into  question  the  application  of the
present  contract-plan,  the  committee  will  hold  an  emergency-48-
meeting  to  determine  the  terms  and  timetable  of the  revised
CP.
Finally,  the  committee  bears  the  responsibility  for  reconciling  disputes
between  the  enterprise  and  government,  but  in case  a matter  cannot  be
resolved  at committee  level  "the  arbitration  of the  President  of the
Republic  vill  be solicited.n
72.  The  SONATEL  contract  contains  a  number  of  worthwhile  innovations:
very  detailed  performance  criteria,  including  quality  of  service  criteria;
a  minutely  detailed  timetable  to  resolve  outstanding  financial  problems;
direct  linkage  to the  budget  process;  and  a  potentially  powerful
supervisory  committee  to  oversee  implementation  and  assist  in  the
resolution  of problems. Information  obtained  from  SONATEL  management  and
the  supervising  agency,  the  DRSP,  in  May  of 1988,  revealed  that  the  firm
vas indeed  achieving  satisfactory  performance  on many  of the  indicators
contained  in  the  CP;  specifically  those  referring  to  quality  of service,
productivity  of  personnel,  internal  financial  projections  and investment
expenditures.  However,  problems  vere  surfacing  due  to  the  fact  that
nothing  at all  had  been  done  on the  key  issue  of settling  the  State's
arrears  --  for  which  a  precise  timetable  had  been  laid  out  in  the  CP.  The
State's  failure  to  pay  for  services  rendered  vas forcing  SONATEL  into  a
situation  of extremely  high  indebtedness,  as it  resorted  to  bank  overdrafts
to  cover  its  shortage  of  vorking  capital. In sum,  the  CP provisions  which
are  within  the  control  of the  enterprise  are  being  met  and  are  having  a
positive  effect. But  these  are  offset  by the  State's  continuing  failure  to
pay its  bills.-49-
A Senegalese  Assessment  of the  CP Process
73.  A government  seminar  on the  CP  process  was  held in  December  of
1986. Seminar  participants,  composee  of government  supervisors,  enterprise
managers  and  technical  assistants  vorking  for  both  parties,  discussed  the
CPs  and  their  problems  but  nonetheless  concluded  that  several  benefits  had
been  brought  about  by the  use  of the  device. The  final  report  of the
seminarll concluded,  without  offering  much in the  way  of supporting
numbers  or data,  that  CP'ed  enterprises  showed  better  personnel  management,
a superior  capacity  to  estimate  investment  needs,  more  success  in  gaining
approval  for  rate  increases,  and  improved  relations  with  suppliers  of
inputs --  resulting,  in  several  cases,  in lower  prices. These  are
significant  improvements,  if they  are  widespread  and  not  just  isolated
instances  in  an  enterprise  or two  (the  wording  of the  report  makes  it
appear  that  the  latter  might  be the  case). Nonetheless,  the  bulk  of the
seminar  was spent  analyzing  deficiencies  of the  process,  and  proposing
remedies.
74.  The  seminar  confirmed  the  obvious;  financial  relations,  or  more
plainly  put, the  government's  failure  to  pay,  is the  problem,  though  other
issues  are  certainly  important.  For  example,  lip-service  is  paid  to  the
concept  of  management  autonomy,  but,  in  practice,  managerial  latitude
remains  quite  limited.  Managers  expressed  concern  over  the  quantity  and
quality  of  performance  indicators,  arguing  that  there  should  be a
f  See "Rapport  de Synthese  du  Seminaire  de  decembre  1986  sur  les
Contrats-Plans,"  Cellule  de Contrat-Plan,  Dakar,  1986.-50-
distinction  between  those  which  are  formal  commitments  of the  enterprise,
and  those  which  are  merely  projected  desirable  outcomes. The  former  should
be as few  and  as clear  as  possible; in  their  opinion,  the  latter  should  be
relegated  to  annexes  and  not  figure  in  the  body  of the  CP.  Managers  also
wanted  to  see  some  linking  of enterprise  performance  to sanctions  and
revards,  and  thought  this  could  be built  into  the  CP  process.
75.  By far  the  most  compelling  topic  was  that  of finances.
Participants  came  up with  many  vorthwhile  suggestions  on  how to  overcome
the  evident  problems. First,  they  asked  for  involvement  of Treasury
officials  (the  Ministry  of  Finance  officers  responsible  for  actual
payments)  in  the  negotiations  and  monitoring  of  the  CPs.  Second,  they
requested  that  a formal  payment  timetable,  agreed  to  by the  Ministry  of
Finance,  be included  in  each  CP.  Third,  they  asked  that  Finance  at least
inform  PEs  when  late  payments  are  in  the  offing. Fourth,  they  vanted  a
simplification  of the  abs-ardly  complicated  paperwork  that  the  State
requires  to  verify  charges  and  payments. Fifth,  a  number  of suggestions
were  made  on linking  PE  payments  to  the  budgeting  cycle. Sixth,  a  call  was
made  for  two  new  committees,  one  specifically  to follow  the  arrears  issue,
and  the  other  to  restructure  financial  matters  as  a whole. The  most
frequently  repeated  word in  the  entire  report  was «rapidly;"  participants
agreed  that  delay  was  strangling  the  Senegalese  parapublic  sector,  or at
least  adding  greatly  to its  costs  of  operations.  The  CP  process  was
adopted  precisely  to  help  resolve  these  problems;  and  one  could  argue  that
the  first  step  towards  resolution  --  quantifying  the  extent  of the
difficulties  --  is  being  achieved.-51-
76.  Nonetheless,  the  State's  failure  to  pay  has  become  a0  widespread
that  SAL  III  (1987-88)  made  the  settlement  of State  obligations,  as set  out
in the  existing  CPs,  a condition  of second  tranche  release. Government
only  managed  to  meet  the  condition,  at the  very  last  moment,  by
unilaterally  decreeing  that  the  sums  given  in  the  CPs  and  lettres  de
mission  were  all  revised  downwards,  thus  allowing  the  State  to  claim  that
it  had  met the  conditions.  On the  one  hand,  this  was  a  weleome  admission
that  the  sums  contained  in the  CPs  were  unrealistic,  and  that  they  must  be
reduced. On the  other  hand,  the  unilateral  change  of figures  negates  the
basic  principle  of the  CP  process: open  negotiation  of "les  engagements
reciproques."  The  change,  without  any  consultation  in  the  affected  firms,
has  added  to  managers'  disappointment  and  cynicism  concerning  CPs. This
action  highlights  yet  again  the  non-contractual  nature  of CPs.  because
first,  they  can  be changed  by the  dominant  party  without  the  involvement  or
knowledge  of the  subordinate  party;  and  second,  the  dominant  party  cannot
be sued  or  otherwise  subjected  to legal  actions  if  the  terms  of the
"contract"  are  not  fulfilled.
77.  Attitudes  prevailing  (in  May  of 1988)  in  Dakar  concerning  the  CP
process  reflect  these  shortcomings.  Most  interviewed  managers  said  that
many  aspects  of the  process  were  worthwhile,  and  cited  the  positive  points
referred  to above. A few  more  openly  said  that  little  or  nothing  was
coming  of CPs,  and  the  usager  results  were  not  worth  the  time  and  effort
they  had to  devote  to their  creation  and  implementation.  The  ORSP's  March,
1988,  review  of the  sector's  progress  listed  each  of the  CPs  in force;  in
almost  every  case  one  finds  a statement  that:-52-
- "only  50  million  (F  CFA)  have  been inscribed  instead  of the  550  million
initially  proposed;"
- "the  State  has still  not  put  the  promised  100  million  at the  disposition
of the  firm;"
- "the  operating  subsidy  of 300  million  has  still  not  been  executed;"
- "231  million  should  have  been  transferred;  186  million  have  been
received;n  etc.
78.  To repeat,  it is  not  only  reasonable,  it is  necessary  and
essential  that  Senegal  reduce  the  suma  invested  in  its  inefficient  PE
sector. But  this  should  be done  by drawing  up reasonable  and  realistic  CPs
in  the  first  place;  not  by creating  elaborate  and  expensive  wish-lists
which  have  no chance  of  being  implemented,  and  which  --  when  they  are  shown
to  be unworkable  and  have to  be continuously  revamped  or are  unilaterally
revised  downwards  --  demotivate  and  discourage  enterprise  managers.
Conclusions  on Senegal
79.  Most  of the  problems  discussed  in this  review  of the  CP  process  in
Senegal  have  resulted  from  shortcomings  of government,  either  shortcomings
of  policy  or deficiencies  in  execution  and  implementation.  This  is  not  to
imply  that  management  has  been  without  fault;  that  were  it  not  for
government's  weaknesses  the  CPed  enterprises  would  have  all  made  dramatic
gains  in  productivity  and  efficiency.  The  more  complicated  truth  is  that
many  Senegalese  public  enterprise  managers  are  insufficiently  well-trained
and  experienced.  A portion  of the  blame  for  poor  performance  must  be
assigned  to  management,  and  to  unskilled  and  indisciplined  workers. The-53-
point  for  this  review,  however,  is that  the  light  generated  by the  CP
exercise  shines  mainly  on government  failures. For  example,  it is  clear
that  one  problem  in  Senegal  has  been  the  relative  weakness  of the  officials
heading  the  Contract  Plan  Supervisory  Unit  in  the  Office  of the  President
(formerly  the  la  Cellule  de Contrat-Plan;  changed  in  1987  to  become  a  more
high-powered  Delegation  a la  Reforme  du Secteur  Parapublic).  To the
present,  this  and  other  overworked  and  understaffed  review  bodies  have
failed  to  exert  sufficient  pressure  on  budget  and  disbursement  offices  to
persuade  them  to  make  promised  payments,  on time  and  in  the  proper  amounts.
This  is  not  to  dispute  the  difficulty  of  their  task.  All the  aggressive
persuasion  in the  world  will  not  work  when  the  Treasury  has  no further
resources  to allocate. (Though  this  raises  again  the  larger  questiLon  of
how  could  the  government  commit  itself  to a  group  of  CPs,  the  aggregate
funding  provisions  of  which  far  exceeded  the  most  optimistic  estimates  of
resource  availability?)  But  some  of their  problems  seem  self-inflicted.
For  example,  the  Unit  did  not  even  hold  a  meeting  to  discuss  SONEES'
disturbing  December,  1985,  report  until  June  of the  following  year.
Recent  changes  in the  leadership  and  operating  terms  of reference  for  this
important  body  will,  it  is  hoped,  lead  to  greater  fulfillment  of the
stipulations  of the  CPs,  in  SONATEL  and  elsewhere. But  leadership  alone  is
not  enough;  there  should  be a reinforcement  of this  key  agency.
80.  The  overall  point  is  that  it  is  not  simply  the  technical  quality
of the  CP's  provisions  which  is important,  but  also  the  nature  of the
institutional  setting  designed  to  prepare  and  promote  the  exercise. In the
absence  of definitive  evidence  that  the  provisions  of a  CP,  even  one  as
carefully  constructed  as  that  of SONATEL,  can  overcome  the  difficulties-54-
prevailing  in Senegal,  the  interim  conclusion  muet  be the  exporience  has
not  produced  the  deaired  results.
81.  Review  on the  ground  reveals  a  steady  stream  of delays,  missed
deadlines,  disagreements  and  misunderstandings  in the  creation  and
implementation  of  CPs. One  CP  vent  through  nine  drafts  over  a two-year
period  before  it  could  be signed. In another  case,  a  manager  stated  that
he  had  been instructed  to sign  his  CP,  even  though  he vas  not  in  agreement
with  its  major  provisions.  He indicated  informally  that  ho  had  no
intention  of implementing  its  measures. A  May,  1986,  supervision  report
noted  that  the  scheduled  preparation  of four  statements  of objectives  and
twelve  CPs  were  all  delayed,  some  indefinitely  so.  The  problem  appeared  to
be that  as  drafters  dealt  with  the  fundamental  financial  issues,  similar  to
the  SONATEL  approach,  government  grew  reluctant  to  commit;  if these  issues
were  ignored  then  managers  refused  to sign. Other  cases  were  awaiting  the
results  of studies,  passage  of legislation,  coordination  with the  plans  of
other  PEs,  etc.  Some  of the  fault  for  the  slow  pace  of  activity  lay  with
t-he  inèffective  supervision  unit,  but it  also  seems  reasonable  to  think
that  the  negotiation/coordination  workload  Was  vast  and  overwhelming.
Whatever  the  reason,  the  fact  remained  that  none  of the  CPs  scheduled  for
signature  in  1986  was  signed  on time,  and  many  remain  unsigned  and  dormant
to the  present  time. In those  that  were  signed  many  key  provisions  have
not  been  kept.  Dramatic,  short-run  improvements  in  performance  have  not
been  brought  about.
82.  The  primary  lesson  is  clear: contract-plans  cannot  by themselves
overcome  the  several,  serious,  deeply  rooted  problems  of the  Senegalese-55-
parapublic  sector  in  particular,  much  loss  the  related  but  grander  scale
problems  of the  economy  as a  whole. The  fundamental  starting  point  is  the
country's  sheer  and  intense  poverty,  the  effects  of  which  are  compounded  by
weak  budgeting  systems  (which  translate  into  a lack  of reliable  information
on  either  the  availability  or liquidity  of funds),  weak  agencies  of review
in  the  technical  and  financial  supervising  ministries,  and  weak  political
commitment  to the  concept  of financial  discipl4ne.  The  CP  process
highlights  these  deficiencies,  and  shows  that  not  all  problems  are  the
fault  of  management;  but  it  does  not  eliminate  them. Moreover,  the
contract-plan  is  meant  to  be  both  binding  and  a plan. Yet,  the  Senegalese
experience  reveals  the  difficulty  of  binding  the  government,  and  the
difficulty  of constructing  a  plan  that  is  both  realistic  and  implementable.
In  miniature,  the  informational  shortcomings  of comprehensive  planning  are
reproduced  in  the  CP  process.
83.  The  French  have  tried  to  solve  the  problems  of complexity  and
uncertainty  by moving  away  from  comprehensive  CPs  towards  shorter,  more
general  statements  of intent  and  broad  policy. The idea  is  to  maximize  the
benefits  of  mutual  goal-setting  and  formalized  dialogue,  which  the  CP
process  provides,  without  becoming  bogged  down  in  specific  numbers  and
quantities.  But  Senegal  (as  other  African  usera  of CPs)  has  generally  been
obliged  to  retain  a greater  degree  both  of  specificity  and  complexity  in
its  contracts.  This  has  been  unavoidable  given  the  extent  of  market
imperfections,  distortions  and  government  interference  in  the  Senegalese
economv,  plus  the  acute  financial  weaknesses  and  poor  performance  of the
firms  subjected  to the  CP  process,  the  rapid  and  unpredictable  shifts  in-56-
international  markets  important  to  Senegal,  and  weak  analytical/
institutional  frameworks.
84.  In short,  the  Senegalese  have  so  many  problema  to deal  with  that
they  cannot  pare  their  CPs  down  to the  bone.  Thus,  the  first  Senegalese
reaction  to  uncertainty  and  difficulty  in  obtaining  government  commitment
to  the  CP  provisions  has  been  to  use  shorter  intervals  --  often  nov  every
six  months  - af review  and  modification,  if  necessary. A second  move  has
been  to strengthen  the  supervisory  committees  and  agencies,  to increase
their  capacity  to  understand  what is  happening  at the  level  of the  firm,
and  to  approach  directly  financial  authorities  and  to push  them  to  honor
obligations.  The  second  initiative  has  not  yet  proven  effective;  the  first
has led  some  involved  in  the  process  to  ask  if  a document  subject  to  change
twice  a  year  can  really  be called  either  a contract  or  a plan.
85.  Irrespective  of the  problems,  the  Bank's  involvement  with the  CP
process  continues. The  parapublic  sector  is  an indispensable  element  of
the  structural  adjustment  operations  the  Bank  has  concluded  with  Senegal
since  1984. Despite  the  deficiencies  of  what  has  so far  been  done,
something  along  the  lines  of  what  the  CP attempts  must  be installed  if  the
sector  is  to  be rationalized.  Though  complaints  about  the  amounts  of time
and  effort  required  to  devise,  negotiate  and  supervise  a CP  are  common,  it
could  still  be argued  that  this  is  a  relatively  low  cost  tool  which  is
setting  the  scene  for  reform. Nonetheless,  it  would  appear  that  at
present,  levels  of  enthusiasm  for  the  CP  concept  have  declined. An
October,  1987,  review  reiterates  that  the  'major  problem  in  the  sector  is
the  whole  area  of financial  relations  between  the  State  and  the  public-57-
enterprises,"  and  notes  that  privatization  and  liquidation  of  PEs  are  now
the  more  burning  issues.
86.  Theoretically,  one  way  to improve  the  situation  is  by substantial
down-scaling  of the  PE sector,  which  would,  presumably,  allow  a  higher
concentration  of scarce  State  capital  and  management  resources  on the
priority  group  of strategic  utilities  and  enteVprises.  In  October  of 1987
the  government  announced  the  first  implementation  phase  of its
privatization  program;  as  of May  of 1988  no sales  had  actually  taken  place.
Most of the  activity  proposed  will  be devoted  to  reducing  the  percentage  of
government  holdings  in  joint  ventures;  only  two  wholly-owned  companies  --
and  certainly  none  of the  large,  monopoly,  social-service  providing  money
losers  --  will  be touched. One  awaits  the  impact  of this  program.
87.  In  the  end,  despite  all  the  problems  associated  with its
implementation,  one  cannot  dismiss  the  concept  of the  contract-plan.  It is
no  panacea;  by itself  it  will  not  and  cannot  overcome  the  effects  of  high
levels  of uncertainty  in  markets,  or the  mistakes,  willful  or  ctherwise,  of
government  policy. However,  in  the  longer  run,  and  in  conjunction  with
more  rational  and  appropriate  macroeconomic  signals,  it is  quite  possible
that  the  CP's  emphasis  on clear  goals  and  especially  on increasing  the
transparency  of operations  could  render  important,  low  cost  assistance  in
the  search  for  more  productive,  efficient  public  enterprises.  That  is,  the
CP  cannot  substitute  for  government  commitment  to  managing  rationally  its
resources;  if such  a  commituent  is  lacking  then  no technique  can  take  its
place. But  it  can  provide,  and  is  providing,  rationalist  reformers  with
the  informational  ammunition  to structure  and  legitimate  reform.-58-
Recommendations
88.  The  CP process  is  worth  rescuing  and  continuing,  but  strong
measures  must  be taken  to  provide  greater  autonomy  for  managers,  and  to
push  the  government  to take  more  seriously  its  financial  obligations.
These  are:  4
(M)  in  the  immediate,  sliort-run,  the  cost-reduction  and  cost-recovery
measures  already  set  forth  in  existing  CPs  must  be enforced. For  example,
the  present  SENELEC  CP clearly  states  that  the  enterprise  has the  right  and
the  obligation  to cut  electricity  service  to  any  subscriber,  including
public  sector  subscribers,  whose  account  is 90  days  overdue. SENELEC
officials  said  they  tried  in 1987  to  enforce  this  measure  but  were  directed
to  desist. SENELEC's  CP  monLtoring  committee,  and  the  DRSP,  should  come
into  action  at  this  point,  calling  the  attention  of highest  officials  to
the  State's  commitments,  and  pushing  for  enforcement  of the  agreed-upon
rules.
(ii)  In  the  slightly  longer-run,  there  must  be a  strengthening  of the
links  between  the  resource  allocation  system  and  the  CP  process. The  CPs
presently  in  effect,  and  all  those  being  negotiated,  require  that  each
ministerial  budget  contain  specified  resources  to  cover  (at  least  a
reasonable  percentage)  of the  ministry's  payments  to enterprises.  CPs  also
contain  detailed  payment  schedules  for  the  settlement  of  arrears. These
items  have  generally  been  inscribed  in  budgets. Nonetheless,  as noted
above,  the  payments  are  often  not  made,  or  made  only  in  part  and  with  great
delay. The  key issue  is  to  ensure  that  the  aggregate  financial  demands  of
public  enterprises  made  in  CPs,  and  agreed  to  by government,  are  in line-59-
with the  aggregate  resources  available.  For  the  moment,  the  only  way to
start  to effect  this  reconciliation  is  by reductions  in  the  levels  of
subsidies and  other,  indirect  means  of State  financing,  to the  PEs.
(iii)  But  in the  long  run,  the  way  to ensure  progress  is  by  making  the
CPs  effective.  The  way in  which  this  can  be done  is  by ensuring  that
government  negotiators  of CPs  possess,  first,  the  knowledge  of  what level
of  financing  can,  reelistically,  be made  available  to the  enterprise,  in
terms  of arrears,  overdue  accounts  settlement,  and  levels  of investment
financing.  Second,  central  reviewers  must  be empowered  to impose  these
realistic  financing  limits  on the  enterprise.  This  necessitates  a
strengthened  capacity  within  government,  most  likely  in  the  Ministry  of
Finance,  to  project  the  legitimate  financial  requirements  of  public
enterprises.  It  will  also  require  a  much  strengthened  capacity  to  project
total  resource  availability,  and  to rank  technically  priority  areas  for
expenditure.
89.  None  of this  will  be easy  to  achieve;  the  listing  of  what  needs  to
be done,  to  allow  the  CP  process  to  accomplish  the  grand  objective  of
helping  to impose  financial  discipline  on  the  State,  reveals  the  magnitude
of the  problem. What  is  certain  is  that  the  benefits  of the  present  CP
process  are  outweighed  by the  costs  of  negotiating  so-called  contract,
containing  unrealistic  financial  commitments,  which  the  State  then  violates
with impunity. The  CP process  is  worth  rescuing,  but it  will take  a  major
commitment  to  do so.-60-
B.  Other  DeveloRina  Countries
90.  No other  developing  country,  African  or otherwise,  has  had  an
experience  with  CPs  comparable  to  that  of Senegal. But  many  have started
down  the  contractualization  path.  Table  1 summarizes  the  CP situation  in
fourteen  developing  countries,  eleven  of them  francophone,  twelve  of them
in Sub-Saharan  Africa. The  table  is  not  at  all  exhaustive.  It is  possible
that  some  African  CPs  are  being  devised  which  have  escaped  the  survey's
attention.  Nor  does  the  table  cover  the  countries  in  which  an interest  in
or intention  to  use  the  CP  has  been  expressed,  but  not  yet  acted  upon;
e.g.,  Madagascar,  Gabon  and  C.A.R.,  among  others. Further,  the  devices
similar  to the  CP  which  are  in  use  or in  preparation  in  Latin  America  --  in
Mexico,  Argentina and Brazil --  are neither covered in the table nor
reviewed  in this  paper. Table  2  provides  some  information  on  where  the
installation  of the  CP  process  is  being  supported  by the  World  Bank. The
remainder  of this  section  will  review,  more  briefly  than  vas  done  in the
case  of Senegal,  the  information  available  on  CP  use in  a sample  of  other
developing  countries.
[INSERT  TABLES  ON NEXT  PAGES]
Congo
91.  The  Republic  of the  Congo,  in the  early  1980s,  independent  of
World  Bank  advice  or assistance,  produced  "program  contracts"  for  ten  major
public  enterprises.  The  primary  purpose  of the  contracts  was  to increase
managements'  autonomy. None  ever  proceeded  to the  implementation  stage;
indeed,  none  of the  ten  were  ever  signed. The  problem  appears  to  have  been-60a-
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that  the  drafting  of the  agreements  degenerated  into  an open  political
conflict,  with the  firms  using  their  versions  of the  draft  CPs  to air
complaints  about  government  policy. The  effort  vas soon  officially
abandoned.  Under an internal --  i.e., non-World Bank supported --
"structural  adjustment"  program  in 1985,  the  Congolese  government  announced
a  re-start  to its  CP  program. Government  stated  that  a new  model  program
contract  vas  being  designed  and  would  soon  be applied  to the  electricity
company,  the  post  and  telecommunications  agency  and  three  other  important
PEs. But  no actual  progress  was  made  on this  front  prior  to the  devising,
vith  World  Bank  assistance,  of  a Public  Enterprise  Sector  Adjustment
Project  (still  in  preparation  at time  of  writing). A major  feature  of the
proposed  project  is  the  restructuring  of the  six  most  important  PEs,  and
the  installation  of appropriately  designed  and  negotiated  CPs.  In  common
vith  many  other  cases  to  be considered  in  this  section,  the  Congo  has  plans
and  hopes  for  the  future  of CPs,  but  little  concrete,  empirical  experience
to analyze --  other  than  the  significant  finding  that  the  two  false  starts
on the  CP process  indicate  that  the  device  is  more  complex  to design  and
implement  than  vas  once  thought  (a  reconfirmation  of the  Senegalese  and
French  experiences).
Morocco
Royal  Air  Maroc
92.  In 1982,  the  Moroccans  installed  a three  year  CP in the  state-
owned  airline,  Royal  Air  Maroc  (RAM). It  expired  in 1984,  and  despite
pleas  for  reneval  from  the  company  and  the  Ministry  of  Transport,  a second-62-
CP  has  not  been  negotiated.  The  RAM  CP defined  the  firm's  objectives,  and
laid  out  the  airline's  required  non-commercial  operations.  It determined
the  formula  for  the  Statels  compensation  to the  airline  for  losses  incurred
from  public  ;ervice  operations  and  price  restraints.  Annual  targets  were
established  for  volume  of sales,  manpower  productivity,  equipment  use
rates,  total  productivity,  the  wage  bill,  and  the  company's  investment  and
financing  plans. A "controleur  de gestion"  (management  supervisor),  an
official  ef the  Ministry  of Finance,  was  appointed  to  oversee  the  proper
implementation  of the  CPs. This  official  was  supposed  to replace  the
traditional  "controleur  financier"  (financial  supervisor)  who  represents
the  Ministry  of  Finance  in  every  Moroccan  PE;  in  fact,  the  "controleur  de
gestion"  post  was  simply  added  on to the  existing  system.  Though  both of
these  officials  are  drawn  from  the  same  pool  of civil  servants,  the
management  supervisor  is  supposed  to  have  a lighter,  more  çz ante  review
function;  and  the  title  was  modified  to  reflect  the  change  of  approach.
Finally,  the  CP established  procedures  for  determining  what  is  owed  to  RAM
by the  government  and  other  PEs,  and  set  payment  schedules  for  clearing  up
these  arrears.
93.  Internal  and  external  observers  agree  that  some  significant
improvements  have  come  about  in  RAM  due  to the  CP.  Management  autonomy  is
said  to  have  improved,  government  interference  to  have  declined. A modest
but  significant  start  has  been  made  on the  long  process  of shifting  away
from  a reliance  on a  Rriori  controls  to a less  rigid  system  of  a  Rosteriori
evaluation  of  performance.  Positive  results  are  claimed  in  RAM's  "system
of internal  control  and  medium  term  planning..  .The  relationship  of
dependence  of  RAM  on the  government  has  been  replaced  by a contractual-63-
relationship  based  on  cooperation,  constructive  dialogue,  and  clearer
definition  of responsibilities." 12
94.  But  as in  Senegal,  the  CP's  physical  and  financial  projections  of
firm  performance  proved  inaccurate,  and  --  most  important  --  the  government
"has  paid  only  a fraction  of the  contributions  to  which  it  was
committed..." Once  again,  financial  commitments  were  not  respected.  With
overestimates  of sales  and  revenues,  and  a large  accounts  receivable
burden,  RAM  has  been forced  to  survive  on overdrafts,  the  interest  costs  of
which  weigh  down  the  balance  sheet. One  of the  benefits  of the  CP  has  been
to  quantify  the  extent  to  which  RAN's  losses  are  a function  of its  poor
capital  structure,  which,  in turn,  is  a function  of  government's  failure  to
pay. Thus,  it  would  seem  that  government  is in  good  part  to  blame  for
RAM's  problems. This  is  not to  say  that  RAN's  management  is  beyond
reproach. But  the  RAM  experience,  in  combination  with  simiular  instances
from  France  and  Senegal,  suggests  that  the  common  government  assertion  that
the  key  PE  problem  is  poor  management,  is  a  self-serving
oversimplification.
95.  Other  problems  have  been  somewhat  more  technical:  weak  cost
accounting,  failure  to  revalue  assets,  productivity  targets  expressed  in
current  as  opposed  to  constant  prices,  and  inability  of the  firm's
financial  officers  to  deal  with  exchange  rate  fluctuations.  These  are  not
problems  of the  CP  per  se;  but  their  presence  has  severely  weakened  the
12/  See  World  Bank,  "Kingdom  of Morocco: Public  Enterprise  Sector  Review,"
August  20,  1986,  p. III,  23..64-
impact  and  utility  of the  process. CPs  thus  suffer  from  a problem  common
to  many  other  reforus  in  LDCs: for  them  to  have the  anticipated  beneficial
impact,  a complex  host  of other  interrelated  factors  must  be functioning  to
a  modicum  standard. If they  are  not,  the  impact  is  minimal.
96.  The  Moroccans  have  drawn  several  conclusions  from  this  first
application  of the  CP  process. They  see  the  desirability  of  making  the  CPs
"rolling,"  i.e.,  subject  to  periodic  review  and  modification.  They
recognize  that  the  state  must  honor  its  obligations  or the  process  will
eventually  founder.  They  see  the  need  to link  CP resulte  vith  sanctions
and  revards. They  recognize  that  for  CPs  to  work the  contracted  enterprise
must  have  an  adequate  level  of accounting,  cost  accounting  and  financial
information  systems.  These  lessons  have  been  taken  into  account  in  the
expansion  of the  CP process.
The  Public  Enterprise  Restructuring  Loan - The  Moroccan  PERL
97.  An expanded  operation,  supported  by the  Bank,  is  presently
underway. A  Public  Enterprise  Restructuring  Loan,  the  PERL,  vas
negotiated  in  1987  and  became  effective  in  December  of that  year. One  of
the  main  institutional  development  components  of the  PERL  is the
negotiation  and  signing  of CPs  in six  important  enterprises:  the  national
electricity  company,  the  national  vater  company,  the  railway,  two  refining
firmas,  and  a  holding  company  controlling  private  sector  distributors  of
petroleum  products. At the  end  of  December  of 1987,  the  CPs  for  the  vater
authority  and  the  holding  company  were  signed  and  approved  by government.
Negotiations  are  underway  for  the  remaining  four  CPs (in  this  first-65-
experimental  wave;  the  government  vill  further  expand  the  concept  if the
experience  is  promising).  As a  condition  of the  PERL,  government  is
eoumitted  to  having  functioning  CPs  in  all  six  enterprises  by the  end  of
1988.  While  too  early  to  judge  definitively  the  effect  on performance,
there  are  elements  in  this  attempt  .o  spread  the  approach  which  merit
mention.
98.  First,  the  Moroccans  are  treating  the  exercise  in  an experimental
and  incremental  manner. Vith  the  RAM  experience  in  mind,  neither  the
involved  government  staff  nor  the  enterprise  officials  regard  CPs  as
ultimate  solutions  for  their  evident  problems,  or as rigid  and  inflexible
agreements.  They  are  seen  as first  and  necessary  steps  in  a lengthy,
adjustable  reform  process,  during  the  course  of  which  both  sides  vill learn
how  to  manage  better  the  sector  and  the  individual  enterprises.  This  has
led  to  the  second  point: Moroccan  CPs  have  been  entirely  devised  by
government  officers  and  enterprise  staff. Consultant  involvement,  foreign
or  domestic,  has  been  minimal. The  reasoning  appears  to  be that  it is
better  to  have imperfect  documents,  the  preparation  benefits  of which
accrue  to  Moroccan  civil  servants  and  enterprise  managers,  than  technically
perfect CPs, prepared --  and understood and supported --  only by outsiders.
99.  The  approach  has  some  costs. Drafts  produced  by the  dynamic  but
inexperienced  contract-plan  section  of DEPP  (the  agency  in the  Ministry  of
Finance  which  oversees  public  enterprises  and  the  reform  program)  tend  to
rely  heavily  on French  examples  and  models. At least  one  draft  CP produced
directly  by an enterprise,  the  railway  (ONCF),  was  more  of a statement  of
enterprise  claims  on the  government  than  a  balanced  presentation  of  mutual*66-
obligations  and  responsibilitios.  The  draft  vas drawn  up in  September  of
1985,  and  approved  by the  Ministry  of  Transport,  the  ONCF's  technical
supervisor.  The  Ministry  of Finance  then  registered  objections  which  have
been  the  subject  of  prolonged,  and  unproductive,  negotlations  in the
ensuing  three  years. A variety  of taxation,  depreciation,  accounting  and
socto-political  issues  are  involved;  the  point  for  this  review  is to
reinforce  the  French  conclusion  that  the  more  difficult  the  financial
position  of an  enterprise,  the  greater  the  difficulty  of installing  a  CP.
The  Office  National  d'Electricite
100.  The  state  of advancement  of this  most  recent  Moroccan  CP process
is illustrated  by the  experience  of the  national  electricity  company,  ONE.
Beginning  in the  mid-1987,  bi-weekly  meetings  between  ONE  management  and
DEPP  officials  have  produced  several  draft  CPs.  Government's  timetable
calls  for  signature  of the  contract  in late  1988. Both  enterprise  and
government  officials  describe  currett  negotiations  as animated. DEPP  cadre
acknowledge  the  quality  of ONE's  management,  and  the  good  quality  of  ONE's
accounting  and  information  systems. While  negotiations  are  expected  to  be
arduous,  DEPP  is  confident  that  a  high  quality  CP  will  be signed  with  ONE
within  the  set  time  limit. ONE  officials  are  somewhat  more  cautious,
warning  that  government  has  a tendency  to think  that  "the  State  has  rights
and  the  enterprise  has  duties." ONE  would  like  to  see  more  evidence  of
Ministry  of Finance  willingness  to  lighten  financial  control  measures  and
accept  the  principle  of compensating  the  enterprise  for  imposed  social
service  obligations.  That  these  issues  are  being  openly  debated  is  an
encouraging  sign.-67-
101.  The  draft  CP for  ONE  presently  under  discussion  owes  much,  for its
overall  framework  and  even  for  some  of its  language,  to the  1984-1988  CP of
Electricite  de France. As  was the  case  with EDF,  ONE's  objectives  and
government's  obligations  are  portrayed  in general  terms;  the  document  does
not  have  the  detailed  specificity  characteristie  of Senegalese  CPs.  For
example,  the  company  contracts  to generate  and  distribute  electricity  at
the  lowest  possible  cost,  to  undertake  an ambitious  investment/construction
program,  and  to  work  with "an  optimal  utilization  of its  human  and  capital
resources."  The  State,  for  its  part,  promises  to  strengthen  the  autonomy
of ONE's  management,  to  clean  up  ONE's  chaotic  financial  situation,  and to
provide  ONE  with  "an  economic,  financial,  legal  and  fiscal  environment
which  favors  the  development  of its  activities."n
102.  The  draft  contract  states  that  ONE  will  raise  its  self-financing
level  from  25  to 30  percent  by 1991. This  will  necessarily  entail  rate
increases;  the  State  agrees  to  a 1988  study  on ONE's  rate  structure.  While
awaiting  the  recommendations  of this  study,  the  State  will  allow  a five
percent  rate  increase  in  each  of the  next  two  years. For  its  part,  the
company,  borrowing  heavily  from  the  wording  in the  EDF  contract,  proposed
that  any  non-commercial  activity  imposed  by the  government  would  be costed
out  and  compensation  paid  to the  firm. DEPP  negotiators  rejected  the
proposed  wording,  and  asked  that  the  contract  discuss  specific  instances  of
non-commercial  operations  rather  than  general  principles.  This  is  one  of
the  matters  presently  under  discussion.  As presently  written,  the  contract
says  that  the  State  guarantees  the  loans  entered  into  by ONE  as part  of its
investment  program,  but specifies  a  debt  ceiling  which  the  firm  cannot-68-
surpasu. Thirteen  different  physical  and  financial  performance  indicators
are  proposed.  13
103.  At the  end  of the  draft  CP,  ONE  officials  have inserted  a
seemingly  innocuous  paragraph  on  which  they  place  great  hopes. It reada:
With a  view to  safeguarding  the  interests  of the  State  while
preserving  the  autonomy  of  management  of ONE,  and  while
maintaining  the  dynamism  necessary  to  a public  establishment
such  as ONE,  which  is  obliged  to  serve  as a principle
provider  of  economic  and  social  development  to the  country,
government  authorities  will take  all  necessary  measures  to
substitute  a  posteriori  controls  for  £ piori measures.
ONE  management  views  this  statement  of  principle  as  a crucial  first  step  in
reducing  the  power,  and  perhaps  eventually  the  presence,  of the  government-
appointed  accountant  and  financial  controller.  The  reduction  of their
powers  is regarded  by public  enterprise  managers  (not  only  those  in  ONE)  as
the  most  attractive  feature  of the  CP.  Government's  reaction  to  this
proposai  remains  to  be seen.
l].  These  are:  level  of productiviry  of personnel,  level  of productivity  of
equipment,  number  of  workers  per installed  KW in  production,  profit  level
of the  grid,  consumption  of inputs,  average  level  of  value-added,  rate  of
return  on fixed  assets,  ratio  of financial  equilibrium,  debt/equity  ratio,
debt  service  ratio,  ratio  of "tresorerie  globale,'  ratio  of the
contribution  of self-financing  to investments,  and  the  level  of investment
financing  by external  loans. The  method  of calculating  all  the  indicators
is  given  in  an annex  to the  CP.-69-
104.  Overall,  the  Moroccan  experience  is  quite  promising.  A long-term,
"learning"  perspective,  has  been adopted. There  haa  been  minimal  reliance
on  external  consultants  (though  there  has  been  heavy  borrowing  from  the
French  models),  and  maximum  use  of local  personnel,  in  both  government  and
the  enterprises.  Moroccan  PE managers  are  sufficiently  experienced  and
self-assured  to recognize  the  potential  benefits  of CPs.  In  line  witli
experience  elsewhere,  it is takir,g  much longer  than  anticipated  to
negotiate  the  contracts;  this  suggests  that  there  is  a  poor fit  between
rapid  disbursement  schedules  of adjustment  lending  and  institutional
reforms  such  as CPs. The  primary  questions,  as in  Senegal,  are  whether  the
State  accepte  the  basic,  control-lighter.ing  philosophy  underlying  the  CP
process,  and  whether  it  will  be able  and  willing  to  honor  its  financial
commitments.
Other  African  Countries
105.  Beni has  implemented  two  instruments  related  to  CPs,  in  the
water/eléutricity  public  enierprise,  and in  the  national  brewery. No
information  is  available  on their  impact  on the  firms'  performance.  Four
other  "action  plans,"  which  are  not  CPs,  but  rather  imposed  restructuring
programs,  are  being  prepared  for  five  major  money-losing  public  companies:
two  cement  plants,  a textile  firm,  the  port  authority  and  a shipping  line.
These  agreements  have  been  prepared  at the  insistence,  and  with  the
support,  of the  World  Bank.
106.  Burundi  is  presently  preparing  "performance  contracts"  in five  key
public  enterprises:  a pharmaceuticals  company,  a  glass  factory,  a savings-70-
association,  a trucking  company  and  an  urban  transport  provider. Thg Ivory
Coast  is  another  country  which,  on its  own, initiated  a  CP process  in  two
public  enterprises  but  abandoned  them  before  implementation.  Under  its
third  Structural  Adjustment  agreement  with the  'Jorld  Bank,  the  country  has
committed  itself  to  extend  the  CP process  to  four  major  firms:
Palmindustrie,  the  national  telecommunications  agency,  the  port  authority
of  Abidjan  and  the  electricity  company.  As of late  1987,  Palmindustris
was implementing --  apparently with considerable  difficulty --  its signed
contract;  the  process  of negotiating  the  other  three  CPs  vas  proceeding
very  slowly. Signatures  were  not  expected  before  mid-1988,  considerably
later  than  anticipated.
107.  Gambia  is  one  of the  first  anglophone  African  countries  to  adopt
the  process. First,  in  late  1986  three  "performance  agreementsn  --
basically,  restructuring  plans  to  put  the  enterprises  on a sound  footing  --
were  drawn  up for  the  peanut  marketing  enterprise,  the  water  and
electricity  firm,  and  the  port services  company. The  principal  architects
of the'approach  were  external  consultants,  Coopers  and  Lybrand. Their
services  were  paid  for  by a Bank  loan. These  agreements  review,  in  the
traditional  form  of  a management  consultant's  diagnosis,  the  past
performance,  problems  and  prospects  of the  enterprises.  Measures  to
improve  performance  are  spelled  out. The  agreements  were then  followed  by
"performance  contracts,n  which  operationalize  the  suggested  set  of
improvements,  and  set  out  an  overall  strategy  for  the  firm. They  also
describe,  in  more  or less  standard  CP form,  the  mutual  obligations  and
responsibilities  of the  contracting  parties.-71-
108.  The  resulting  documents  are  an interesting  "anglo-saxon"  variation
on the  CP theme. Particularly  intriguing  is the  attempt  to  use  the  CP as  a
restructuring  mechanism,  at a time  when  most French  analysts  have concluded
that  the  process  of performance  reform  or improvement  should  be distinctly
separated  from  the  CP procedure.  Another  pragmatic  innovation  is  the
"pilot  plan  strategy,"  by which  mini-versions  of the  full  CP  are  signed  and
monitored  closely  for  a three  month  period. Depending  on the  results
during  this  trial  run,  the  next  performance  contract  would  run  for  twelve
months. Only  if this  experience  proves  positive  will  the  more  normal,
pluriannual  approach  be adopted. At time  of  writing,  two  of the  three
firms  have signed  the  trial  run,  three  month  agreements.  External  analysts
had  expressed  concern  that  the  original  performance  contracts  were  too
detailed  and  complicated;  this  concern  was  shared  by involved  Bank  staff.
The  result  was  that  the  contracts  used in  the  trial  runs  have  been  slightly
simplified.  The  experiment  has  just  begun;  there  is  no information  on
which  to  hazard  even  a tentative  judgement  as to their  impact.
109.  Madagascar,  Mali,  Niger  and  Tg  have  attempted  to insta'l  CPs in
at least  one  of their  public  enterprises.  In  Togo's  case,  efforts  were
made in  1982  to  draft  two  CPs,  one  in  an industrial  firm,  one  in the
national  water  company. Neither  proceeded  past  first  draft  stage. The
other  three  countries  are  presently  negotiating  CPs  for  one  major  firm
(each). In these  countries,  as  elsewhere  in the  region,  CPs  are  most
commonly  applied  to  electricity  producers  and  suppliers  (in  six  different
countries).  As  noted,  a number  of other  Sub-Saharan  countries  are in  the
first  stages  of CP  preparation..72-
First  Efforts  in India
110.  Outside  of  Africa,  India  has  long  been  seeking  ways to improve  the
performance  of its  large  and  insufficiently  profitable  public  enterprise
sector. Interest  in the  contract  approach  vas  sparked  by a January,  1986,
seminar  on the  CP  process  --  presented  in  New  Delhi  by officials  of the
French  government.  The CP  approach  vas  generally  outlined,  and  recommended
for  widespread  application,  in  the  report  of the  Sengupta  Committee  on
Public  Enterprise  Reform,  presented  in  December  of 1986.  In  March  of 1986,
well  before  the  release  of the  Sengupta  Committee's  document,  a trial
"memoranda  of  understanding"  (the  term  the  Indians  use  for  CP)  had  been
created  and  applied  to  the  Oil  and  Natural  Gas  Corporation.  This  agreement
ran  for  a  one  year  period. In  March  of 1987  a second  MOU  vas signed  by
officials  of the  corporation;  it  vill  run  for  two  years. In September  of
1987,  a one  year  MOU  was  signed  for  the  Steel  Authority  of India,  Ltd.
Negotiations  are  well advanced  for  MOUs in  Bharat  Heavy  Electrical  Ltd.,
and  the  National  Textile  Corporation.  MOUs  are  also  in  preparation  for  two
public  holding  companies  in  the  engineering  goods  sector. If the  results
of  MOUs  are  promising  in these  first  instances,  the  process  will  be
expanded.
111.  An October,  1987,  World  Bank  mission  to  review  the  Indian  public
enterprise  sector  included  a specialisr  on  CPs. His task  was  to  assess  the
MOU  process  to date.  The  resulting  report  14  noted  the  obvious: that  it
lk/  Thierry  LeRoy,  "Etude  des  Memoranda  of  Understanding,"  Banque  Mondiale,
Mission  sur  les  entreprises  publiques  industrielles,  decembre,  1987..73-
Was too  early  to assess  the  process. However,  a  number  of insights  were
generated. First,  the  MOU is  seen  within  India  as a  way  of achieving  a
much-needed  increase  in the  autonomy  of enterprise  managers;  indeed,  this
is its  primary  justification.  Second,  though  modeled  after  the  French  CP
process,  the  Indian  conception  contains  some  major  differences.  That  is,
MOUs in  existence  or in draft  run  for  one  or two  years  at  most;  they  define
the  enterprise's  physical  and financial  goals  in  great  detail  (but  do net
deal  with  investments);  the  sections  on the  state's  obligations  deal  only
vith  defining  --  lightening  --  the  procedures  of  control  and  review  and  not
with  strategic  issues  or  with  matters  of capital  structure;  and  the
autonomy  so far  granted  to  the  enterprises  is quite  modest  and
circumscribed  by government  restraints.
112.  Detailed  reporting  and  monitoring  systems  are  strictly  applied  by
central  authorities. Enterprises  are  required  to submit  extensive
implementation  reports  each  quarter. Officials  complain  that  MOU
monitoring  procedures  are  added  on to  older  reporting  requirements;  they
are  not  substituted  for  them. Managers  have  not  been able  to  obtain
autonomy  on several  critical  matters: pricing,  schemes  linking  pay  to
productivity,  and  financial  restructuring.  The  report  argued  that  the  MOU
process  had a  long  way  to go in  India,  as government  supervisors  go far
appear  unwilling  to shed  their  dirifiste  attitudes  and  practices.  The
report  viewed  the  first  batch  of  MOUs  as lincomplete,"  as  not  covering  all
the  issues which  need to  be addressed.  For  example,  none  of the  MOUs  in
force  or in  process  deals  with the  non-commercial  objectives  or activities
of the  enterprise,  and  nothing  is  mentioned  concerning  compensation  for
Lihese  activities.  The  MOUs  prepared  to  date  are  primarily  statements  of-74-
enterprise  objectives.  The  key  commitments  of the  state,  with regard  to
equity  injections,  subsidies,  loan  guarantees,  pricing  policy,  ini'estments
and  labor  policy,  are  not  spelled  out. The  report  repeatedly  underlines
the  admission  that  there  are  not  yet  sufficient  data  on which  to  base  a
measurement  of the  MOUs'  effect  on performance.  Nevertheless,  it concludes
that  the  introduction  of the  MOU is  a  potentially  progressive  and
beneficial  idea. The  major  recommendation  of the  report  is that  the
concept  needs  to  be more  thoroughly  thought  out,  more fully  applied.
III. Conclusions  and  Recommendations
Summary  of the  Main  Points
113.  .n 1967,  the  Nora  Report  recommended  contractualization  as  a
process  to improve  the  productivity  and  efficiency  of public  enterprises.
Twenty  years  later,  French  proponents  of contract-plans  stress  their
utility  as devices  which  can:
...  establish  the "rules  of the game"  between the state and
the  enterprise..  .to  define  clear  objectives  and  precise  and
limited  mutual  obligations..  .and  above  all  to  develop  a
climate  of  confidence  between  the  representatives  of the
state  and  the  managers  of  an enterprise.1 5
L5/  This  wording  is  used  by  Michel  Testard,  "Le  Contrat-Plan,"  a
presentation  document  of SEMA-METRA  Conseil,  Paris,  decembre,  1987,
paraphrasing  an article  by J. deChalendar,  "L'Etat  et les  entreprises
publiques  dans  les  pays  en  developpement,"  Revue  Francaise
d'Administration  Publigue,  octobre-decembre,  1984,  pp. 595-610.-75-
The  view  of what  one  can  expect  from  CPs  has  thus  evolved. Firet  claima  or
hopes  were  quite  ambitious;  expectations  have  moderated,  in  the  light  of
experience.  This  is  natural. Reform  mechanisma,  no matter  how  well
devised,  supported  and  implemented,  seldom  achieve  all  the  objectives  put
forward  by their  creators.  Still,  in France,  CPs  continue  to  be regarded
as  beneficial  mrchanisms  by  both their  Gaullist  inventors  and  their
Socialist  modifiers.  Only  liberals  (well-represented  in the  Ministry  of
Economy,  Finance  and  Privatization  from  1986  to  1988),  with  their  emphasis
on scaling-down  the  state  and  enlarging  the  role  of  markets,  have  been  less
than  enthusiastic.  But  even  their  views  could  change.  The  present  pause
in  the  French  privatization  campaign,  brought  about  by the  dowr.-turn  in
world  financial  markets  in  the  last  part  of 1987,  and  the  re-election  of
the  Socialists  in  1988,  will  probably  re-direct  attention  to  the
fundamental  question  cf  how  to  devise  a  mechanism  which  will  optimize
productivity,  efficiency  and  the  goals  of the  state. Moreover,  governments
do not  have to  concentrate  on  either  privatization  or performance
improvement  of  PEs;  they  can  and  often  do  pursue  both  policies  at the  same
time.
114.  In  both  France  and  developing  countries  the  individual  CPs  have
been  carefully  crafted  by skilled,  experienced  teama  of civil  servants  and
enterprise  managers. In  Senegal  and  several  other  African  countries  these
national  teams  have  been  aided  by consultants  drawn  from  several  of the
better  known  European  and  North  American  firms. The  point  is  that  the
technical  competence  of the  CPs  it not in  question  (with  the  exception  of  a
few  hastily  prepared  failures  in  Togo  and  Congo). The  problems  have  been
more in implementation  and  less  in  design. In  France,  this  manifested-76-
itself  in the  overly  ambitious,  excessively  specific  first  group  of CPs;
but the  process  was,  without  too  much  difficulty,  modified,  simplified  and
rendered  more  general. In line  with the  shift  in  terminology,  the  process
became  less  of a specific  program  and  more  of  a sub-part  of an overall
plan. Along  the  way,  the  targets  of  CPs  became  broader.
115.  For  developing  country  users  of the  approach,  the  situation  is
different. In Sub-Saharan  Africa  one  generally  finds  severe  weaknesses  in
the  core institutions  of  macroeconomic  management  --  i.e.,  the  Ministry  of
Finance,  the  Budget  department,  the  Treasury,  the  Planning  offices. These
central  bodies  responsible  for  the  matching  of the  supply  of government
resources  to aggregate  demand  often  have failed  to do  their  job.  The
result  is  that  governments  commit  themselves  to  expend  funds  far  in  excess
of what  is  available.  As the  Senegalese  experience  demonstrates,  one
result  of governments  being  either  unable  or unwilling  to  honor  their
financial  obligations  is  that  the  rationale  for  the  CP  process  is  called
into  question.
116.  In  Morocco,  financial  obligations  of the  state  are  being  met  under
the  PERL  program. The  crucial  factors  seem  to  be:  (a)  the  existence  of
modest  in  scope  and  technically  thorough  CPs,  combined  with (b)  a powerful
and  determined  central  body supervising  tl--  CP  process  --  in this  case
located in the Ministry of Finance --  which is  willing and able to
persuade,  pressu.re  and  cajole  Budget  and  Treasury  authorities  concerning
the  necessity  of respecting  resource  and  payment  commitments  and
timetables.  There  is  no guarantee  that  the  honoring  of commitments  will
continue  indefinitely;  that  what  has  been  accomplished  in  one  or two-77-
enterprises  vill  automatically  and  smoothly  be repeated  in  the  growing
number  of enterprises  submitted  to the  contract  process  (recall  that  the
Moroccan  schedule  calls  for  signed  CPs in  six  major  enterprises  by the  end
of 1988). Indeed,  one  could  argue  that  the  more  enterprises  with
contracts,  the  greater  the  sums  of  money  in  question,  and  the  greater  the
temptation  for  hard-pressed  Treasury  officials  to  resort  to the  old  game  of
partial  and/or  late  payments. (But  other  aspects  of the  Bank-sponsored  PE
reform  program  should  alleviate  this  problem;  e.g.,  tariff  increases  vill
raise  the  levels  of self-financing  of enterprises  and  reduce  the  need for
state  subventions.)
117.  The  Moroccan  case  suggests  that  the  process  requires  a strong,
vell  placed  supervisory  agency  to  assist  in  CP preparation,  review
implementation,  and  especially  push for  the  proper  fulfillment  of the
agreements.  The  difference  between  present  progress  and  past  difficulties
(in  RAM)  seem  attributable  to the  actions  of the  DEPP.  Certainly  the
absence  of a dynamic  oversight  body  created  difficulties  in  Senegal;  a
recent  change  of structure  and  personnel  in the  agency  has  resulted  in  some
signs  of progress. A difficult  and  delicate  task  for  reformers  is finding
the  proper  balance  betveen  empowering  the  managers  through  the  CPs,  and  at
the  same  time  endoving  an  oversight  agency  with  sufficient  "clout"  to
enforce  the  agreements.
118.  The  comparatively  good  state  of development  of  Moroccan
administrative  agencies,  and  the  basically  sound  management  and  procedures
in  the  Moroccan  public  enterprises  chosen  to  lead  the  reform  program,  meant
that  the  CPs  could  be negotiated  vithout  recourse  to  external  assistance.-78-
The process  is  thus largely seen as an indigenous Moroccan  endeavor, which
may  be a substantial  beneflt. One  cannot  read  too  much  into  the  embryonic
Moroccan  program. The  new  CPs  have  just  entered  into  operation,  and there
are  some  problem  cases  in  the  group  to  be negotiated  in  1988. The  verdict
is  hardly  in;  what  one  can  say  is "so  far,  so good."
119.  Several  countries  have  attempted  to  use  the  CP mechanism  to
restructure  or resurrect  desperately  sick  enterprises  --  France  in the  case
of the  CGM,  Senegal  for  the  rural  development  agencies,  all three
undertakings  in  the  Gambia,  and  two  instances  (not  discussed  ln  this
review)  in  Bangladesh. Except  for  the  Gambian  case  --  where,  at first
glance,  performance  seems  to  be improving  markedly  in  PEs  using  CPs in  this
manner  --  this  usage  has  produced  disappointing  results. This  would  appear
to  lend  weight  to the  conclusion  that  the  CP is  best  used  to regularize  and
improve  the  framework  in  which  a firm  operates;  lt is  not  automatically  the
mechanism  of choice  for  healing  a sick  company. Results  have  been  more
encouraging  when the  CP ls  applied  to  enterprises  with  a  modicum  endowment
of competent  management,  sound  financial  and  reporting  procedures,  and  a
basically  commercial  orientation:  Air  France,  SONATEL  in  Senegal,  ONEP
(the  water  company)  in  Morocco,  Bharat  Heavy  Electricals  Ltd.  in India,  for
example.
120.  The  fact  that  the  agreements  have  not, in  spite  of their  name,
proven  to  be legally  enforceable  contracts  is  particularly  important.  If
governments  cannot  be legally  bound  to  honor  their  commitments  in the  CP,
then  what  is the  status  of the  obligations  imposed  on the  enterprise?  The
experience  discussed  above  indicate  that  governments  have  often  ignored,-79-
with impunity,  the  covenants  of their  CPs. The  negative  operational
results  are  evident. The  question  remains: what,  if  anything,  can  be done
to increase  the  degree  of legal  enforceability  of CPs,  from  the  point  of
view  of the  enterprises  (in  most  cases  the  government  has  sufficient  powers
at its  disposal  to  impose  its  will  on the  companies).  Shrill  and
persistent  haranguing  of resource  dispensing  authorities  --  by a government
oversight  agency,  an association  of public  enterprise  managers  or  board
chairmen,  by interested  staff  of international  assistance  agencies  --  has
sometimes  increased  government's  compliance  with  a  CP's  provisions. It
does  not  solve  the  legal  issue  of  whether  a  government  will  allow  itself  to
be subjected  to  judicial  proceedings  to enforce  a contract,  especially
where  the  complainant  is  a subsidiary  body  of the  government  itself. The
unlikelihood  of governments  allowing  themselves  to  be sued  is a  major
reason  why the  term  "contract"  should  be eliminated  from  the  process. A
more  accurate  term  would  be "performance  agreement;"  and indeed,  the  term
is  already  in  use  in  anglophone  Africa  and  Latin  America.
121.  The  way  in  which  control  structures  have  differed  before  and  after
the  introduction  of  CPs is  an insufficiently  examined  question. In  Morocco
and  India,  and  probably  elsewhere,  the  main  attraction  of CPs  for
enterprise  managers  has  been the  hope  or the  promise  that  the  supervision
process  would  be simplified  and  lightened;  that  some  steps  would  be
limited,  that  more  latitude  would  be given  to  management,  that  the  need  for
government  approval  on marginal  matters  would  be eliminated.  Yet in  most
instances,  governments  have  proven  reluctant  to  give  up established  control
and  review  procedures.  The  provisions  of CPs  have  been  added  to,  and  not
replaced,  traditional  methods. To  maximize  the  beneficial  effect  of the-80-
CP, these instruments  should replace --  not be added to --  existing
supervision  and  control  mechanisms.
Recommenda-ti  ns for Government and World  Rank  Staff
122.  In  light  of this  review,  government  planners  and  World  Bank  staff
contemplating  the  introduction  of a  CP should  exercise  caution. The  CP  is
of  value,  but its  berefits  have  been  oversold. Application  of a CP can
produce  positive  resulta,  but it  does  not  guarantee  that  performance  will
improve. The  existence  of  a CP --  though  signed  in good  faith  by both
parties  --  vill  not, in  and  of itaself,  overcome  the  obstacles  of  poor
policy,  fiscal  indiscipline  and  incompetent  management.  CPs  must  be part
of a complex  and  concerted  program  of reform. Government  officials  and
Bank  staff  should  not  expect  that  the  application  of a technique  will
change  long  standing  attitudes  and  behavior  patterns,  especially  when  those
patterns  result  in,  and  are  reinforced  by,  material  revards.
123.  The  complexity  of the  PE reform  process  indicates  that  ambitions
should  be modest  at the  outset. CPs  should  be created  for  and  applied  in
one or two test cases --  preferably social service providing monopolies --
on a trial  basis. CPs  should  be clear,  concise  and  as simple  as the
circumatances  permit. Lengthy  and  minutely  detailed  specification  of
objectives  and  operating  procedures  is  usually  a sign  that  the  process  has
been  misinterpreted. The  process  of negotiation  is  as important  as the
document  produced. Primary  objectives  for  trial  CPs  might  be limited  to
goal  clarification,  expansion  of  managerial  autonomy,  and  the  creation  of  a
formal  negotiating  process. Expansion  of the  procesa  to  more  complex  goals-81  -
and larger  numbers of PEs would come about when --  or if --  the device is
shown  to  be of  practical,  measurable  value. If this  cautious  approach  is
adopted,  the  implication  is that  the  creation  and  implementation  of CPs
should  probably  nDU  be matters  for  conditionality  in  Bank  adjustmont
operations;  at least  until  the  procesa  has  been tested  in-country  and  shown
to  be workable  and  beneficial.
124.  Finally,  the  study  raises  a number  of questions  that  cannot  be
resolved  with  available  information.  Further  analysis  should  focus  on:
the  revised  role  of the  enterprise  board  of directors  under  a CP regime;
more  systematic  assessment  of CPs'  performance  impact;  whether  and  how  CPs
change  the way governments supervise  PEs; and --  in the longer run --
comparison  of countries  using  various  forms  of the  CP  mechanism,  and
comparison  between  ciuntries  using  CPs  and  other  types  of performance
evaluation  devices;  e.g.,  the  systems  in  use  in  Pakistan  and  Korea.1 6
1J6/  For  a  brief  description  of the  Pakistani  "signaling  system"  used  in
industrial  PEs,  see  Arntraud  Hartmann  and  Syed  Ali  Navab,  "Evaluating
Public  Manufacturing  Enterprises  in  Pakistan: An Experimental  Monitoring
System,"  Finance  and  Development,  Vol.  22,  No.  3 (September,  1985),
pp.  27-30;  and  for  Korea  see  Young  C. Park,  "A  System  for  Evaluating  the
Performance  of Government-Invested  Enterprises  in the  Republic  of  Korea,"
World  Bank  Discussion  Paper,  No.  3, 1986.PPR  Working  Paper  Sertes
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